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ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION:
FEDERALISM, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
AND THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR
Karen M. Tani †
This Article intervenes in a burgeoning literature on “administrative
constitutionalism,” the phenomenon of federal agencies—rather than
courts—assuming significant responsibility for elaborating the meaning of
the U.S. Constitution. Drawing on original historical research, I document
and analyze what I call “administrative equal protection”: interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in a key federal agency
at a time when the Clause’s meaning was fiercely contested. These interpretations are particularly important because of their interplay with cooperative
federalism—specifically, with states’ ability to exercise their traditional police
power after accepting federal money.
The Article’s argument is based on a story of change over time. In the
late 1930s, when federal courts appeared reluctant to vindicate equal protection claims, the Federal Social Security Board (later to become part of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare) took a more active role via its
administration of federal grants for state-run public welfare programs.
Through the 1940s and 1950s, agency lawyers developed and applied a
nondeferential rationality model of equal protection to assess state welfare
rules. When paired with the agency’s control over generous federal subsidies,
this interpretation had tangible consequences: administrators challenged
some of the era’s most restrictive state welfare laws and, in the process, spread
the notion that poor Americans had constitutional rights, including under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the mid-1960s, as the agency became embroiled in battles over school desegregation, administrators deftly recharacterized their constitutional interpretation as a statutory one. They saw their
constitutional arguments take on new life, however, as welfare rights
advocates (including former agency personnel) wielded them in court. Both
developments are visible in the landmark case King v. Smith (1968). There
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the Supreme Court affirmed the poor claimants’ victory in the court below,
but rejected the lower court’s equal protection holding in favor of one
grounded in the agency’s novel statutory interpretation. Administrative
equal protection thus continued to operate as a meaningful constraint on
state action—and in fact helped remake the administration of American
poor relief in the late twentieth century—but remained hidden from view.
In addition to giving content and direction to the study of administrative constitutionalism, this history enriches legal scholarship in three ways:
(1) it provides context for the “new federalism” revolution of the last decades
of the twentieth century; (2) it opens up new questions about today’s “uncooperative federalism”; and (3) it helps explain the penurious protections that
today’s equal protection jurisprudence offers the poor.
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B. Federal Agencies in
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INTRODUCTION
There is no more celebrated cohort of lawyers in modern American history than the “New Deal lawyers”—the men and women who
flocked to Washington, D.C., in the 1930s and early 1940s to design,
defend, and administer President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ambitious
slate of recovery and reform measures.1 Alanson Work Willcox was
one of these lawyers. In 1934 he left private practice in New York City
to heed the Treasury Department’s call: the U.S. government had just
abandoned the existing gold standard, and it desperately needed lawyers to draft regulations for transactions in gold bullion and silver. In
a pattern that would be familiar to many New Deal lawyers, this
short-term consulting gig led to another, and by 1936 Willcox had a
permanent position with one of the New Deal’s brand new agencies,
the Social Security Board.2
As Assistant General Counsel to the Social Security Board,
Willcox helped defend the Social Security Act of 1935 against constitutional challenges,3 leading to several thrilling victories.4 The cornerstone of the modern welfare state, the Act created national systems of
old-age and unemployment insurance and authorized a generous system of federal subsidies for state welfare programs.5 The favorable
Supreme Court decisions thus preserved a vital component of the
New Deal. Along with other decisions from the spring 1937 Term,
they also suggested a historic reorientation of the Court: after famously striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act and the
Agricultural Adjustment Act,6 the Court seemed to signal that it would
no longer second-guess social and economic legislation.7
1
See generally Michele Landis Dauber, New Deal Lawyers, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 399, 399–403 (David S. Tanenhaus ed., 2008) (synthesizing existing literature on New Deal lawyers); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS
300 (1982) (recounting the important legal work of attorneys in the National Recovery
Administration, Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB)).
2
Bertram F. Willcox, Alanson Willcox: From Waddington to Washington, CORNELL
ALUMNI NEWS (Cornell Alumni Ass’n, Ithaca, N.Y.), May 1979, at 29, 30.
3
Id.
4
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–45 (1937) (upholding the Act against a
challenge to the financing of the old-age insurance program); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 585–90 (1937) (upholding the Act’s unemployment compensation provisions against a Tenth Amendment challenge); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S.
495, 527 (1937) (upholding the Act against a challenge to the financing of the unemployment insurance program).
5
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 620–27 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
6
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87–88 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
7
See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 219–28 (1995) (outlining the Supreme
Court decisions that constituted the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937). Historians disa-
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With the legality of the New Deal secured, Willcox might have
returned to the more lucrative world of private practice—yet he
stayed on. Perhaps it was because of the sense of community that the
Social Security Board fostered (the General Counsel’s softball team
reportedly enjoyed a “keen[ ] rival[ry]” with the team from the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation8); or perhaps the coming of
World War II inspired him to remain in government service.9 Ultimately, Willcox worked for the same federal agency for twenty-five
years: from 1936 to 1953 and again from 1961 to 1969.10 He watched
the Board transition from an independent agency to part of
Roosevelt’s cleverly named Federal Security Agency (FSA), where it
would join the Public Health Service, the Office of Education, and the
Food and Drug Administration, among others; the FSA would in turn
become the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
where Willcox would end his career.11
During the decades after 1936, this Article argues, Willcox and
other agency lawyers engaged in legal work every bit as significant,
although much less visible, than their defense of the landmark Social
Security Act: they developed a theory about how the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause12 ought to apply in one crucial
gree about the extent to which Supreme Court jurisprudence changed markedly in the
spring of 1937. Compare HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 200–02 (1993) (arguing that the
United States “underwent a true constitutional revolution” with the Court’s minimum wage
decisions from spring of 1937 and later), with BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 89–91 (1998) (emphasizing the
importance of longer-term doctrinal evolution on the Supreme Court’s decision making in
1937 and claiming that the minimum wage decisions were “no different from other . . .
regulations that the Court had upheld”).
8
THOMAS H. ELIOT, RECOLLECTIONS OF THE NEW DEAL: WHEN THE PEOPLE MATTERED
141 (1992).
9
Bertram Willcox, Alanson’s brother and the author of the article cited in note 208,
infra, interrupted his own legal career to serve in the Ambulance Field Service during
World War I and as a member of the Appeals Board of the U.S. War Labor Board during
World War II. Cornell Men Carry the American Flag to the French Front, XIX CORNELL ALUMNI
NEWS (Cornell Alumni Ass’n, Ithaca, N.Y.), May 31, 1917, at 398, 401; Kheel Center for
Labor-Management Documentation and Archives, Cornell University Library, Bertram F.
Willcox Arbitration Papers, 1950–1969, available at http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/EAD/
htmldocs/KCL05394.html.
10
See Willcox, supra note 2, at 30–32.
11
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization
at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 593 (2009). In 1979, HEW
became the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Historical Highlights, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015). In 1995, the Social Security Administration came full circle, once again
becoming an independent agency, but the Social Security Act’s remaining “welfare” program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which would soon become Temporary Aid to Needy Families) remained with HHS. Id.
12
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).

R
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context—the administration of federal grants-in-aid—and they put
that theory into practice. I call this phenomenon “administrative
equal protection.” Drawing on extensive primary source research in
government archives, personal papers, and legal records, I trace the
development of administrative equal protection and I link it to
concrete outcomes: changes in state laws, federal policies, and even,
circuitously, Supreme Court doctrine.
Administrative equal protection may sound like a contradiction
in terms: Every first-year law student learns that it is the function of
courts, not agencies, to decide what the Constitution means. According to a burgeoning literature on “administrative constitutionalism,”
however, agencies play a much greater role in interpreting the
Constitution than scholars have previously imagined.13 Indeed, administrative constitutionalism appears to be a defining feature of our
“age of statutes”14—a practice that has been built into the U.S. legal
system. For instance, the administrative equal protection described
here grew directly out of an agency’s statutorily delegated obligations.
The Social Security Act charged the Social Security Board not only
with running the brand new national social insurance programs, but
also with administering grants-in-aid to the states for three need-based
income support programs: Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), Old
Age Assistance, and Aid to the Blind.15 (Federal administrators referred to these programs as “public assistance”; we would now probably call them “welfare.”) A state that wished to receive federal funds
13
On “administrative constitutionalism,” see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010)
(situating administrative constitutionalism in the broader study of American constitutionalism and explaining how it operates); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 807 (2010)
(providing a pioneering “examin[ation] [of] how agencies actually go about interpreting
and implementing the Constitution” and “how administrators’ interpretations affect what
it means to be governed by the Constitution”); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013) (surveying works in the emerging field of administrative constitutionalism and providing an initial framework for evaluating this
phenomenon). It is possible to define administrative constitutionalism more broadly than
I do. Whereas I focus on administrators’ application and interpretation of the
Constitution, some scholars—most notably Eskridge and Ferejohn—also include the elaboration of “small ‘c’ constitutional public norms and needs” and the interpretation of
landmark legislation (what they call “superstatutes”). ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra, at
32–33. Eskridge and Ferejohn also do not limit their actors to administrators. They associate administrative constitutionalism with “the normative, problem-solving” work of a wide
variety of “political (as opposed to judicial) officers,” including “legislators and their staffs”
and “chief executives and their advisers.” Id. at 26. Metzger’s definition of administrative
constitutionalism is also broader than mine, in that her definition encompasses “the construction (or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state through structural and substantive
measures.” Metzger, supra, at 1900.
14
See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95–97 (1979).
15
Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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submitted a state “plan”—essentially, a compilation of all the laws and
policies pertaining to the state’s welfare program—and if the plan satisfied federal requirements, the agency began issuing matching grants
(i.e., reimbursements for a portion of what the state spent).16 Federal
review was ongoing: federal administrators issued grants on a quarterly basis, conducted various types of post-hoc audits, and evaluated
all changes to state plans.17 In short, the Social Security Act required
federal administrators to review state laws, policies, and administrative
decisions. It is little wonder that the Fourteenth Amendment (promising that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”18) cast a shadow over their dayto-day work.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides an overview of the
literature on administrative constitutionalism, explaining how the
U.S. legal system encourages this phenomenon and why it matters.
Because administrative constitutionalism is of such pressing interest,
Part I argues, we badly need additional empirical work, especially on
constitutional interpretations that intersect with the theories and
practices of American federalism. To this end, Part I introduces the
Article’s main example: administrative equal protection in the federal
agency charged with administering federal welfare grants to states in
the mid-twentieth century.
Parts II through IV go deep into the archives to recover administrative equal protection’s revealing “life story.”19 Equal protection,
Lawrence Sager famously argued, is a classic “underenforced constitutional norm”: the constructs that the federal judiciary has developed
to enforce this constitutional concept have tended to capture “only a
small part of the universe of plausible claims” (i.e., the judiciary has
artificially “truncated” the broader concept).20 It is thus not surprising to see the Equal Protection Clause enjoy a robust life outside the
courts. Until now, however, an important aspect of that life has been
hidden from view.
16

Id.
MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN
MASSACHUSETTS 21–22 (1970).
18
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19
I hope that other scholars will elaborate on my telling of the “life story.” In the
period under examination, other grant-administering and benefit-conferring agencies
(e.g., the Department of Transportation, the Internal Revenue Service) likely also considered the Equal Protection Clause in the course of their work, especially after the Supreme
Court began to suggest that segregation was constitutionally impermissible. The literature
on administrative constitutionalism would be considerably enriched if we could compare
administrative equal protection across the administrative state.
20
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1214, 1216 (1978).
17
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In Part II, I argue that as early as 1936, federal welfare administrators applied the Equal Protection Clause to their work. In this
post–Lochner era,21 when federal courts appeared reluctant to accept
equal protection arguments, agency lawyers developed a version of
“rational basis review with bite”22 to evaluate state welfare laws. Their
interpretation of equal protection directly affected the administration
of grants-in-aid to the states between the late 1930s and early 1960s,
including, as Part III contends, in the era of “massive resistance” to
civil rights gains.
The increasingly acerbic federal-state disputes analyzed in Part III
set the stage for Part IV, in which I discuss another heretofore unrecognized phenomenon: the way in which the agency’s interpretation of
equal protection intersected with people and forces outside the
agency and ultimately made its way into Supreme Court doctrine. In
the mid-1960s, an influential network of activists, social welfare workers, and lawyers (including former agency personnel) began using the
agency’s ideas about equal protection to challenge the nation’s welfare system—first in formal agency hearings and then in federal court.
Administrators, meanwhile, changed tactics. With the federal government’s responsibilities for welfare and education now housed in the
same agency, administrative equal protection had become more dangerous. Administrators responded by reframing their constitutional
interpretation as a statutory one, rooted specifically in the Social Security Act. The landmark welfare rights case King v. Smith (1968) illustrates the complexity of administrative equal protection: in a sweeping
and important decision, poverty lawyers won recognition for poor
people’s rights against states, but the Supreme Court used the
agency’s statutory interpretation to dodge the equal protection question. The legacy was mixed: two years later, in a less sympathetic case,
the Supreme Court “emasculat[ed] . . . the Equal Protection Clause as
a constitutional principle applicable to the area of social welfare administration” (in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall),23 but the
Court’s liberal statutory interpretation endured, transforming the relationship between poor claimants and state welfare providers.
21
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), has come to stand for an entire era, one in
which judges used the Reconstruction Amendments to protect individual economic liberty
from majoritarian social and economic reform legislation, rather than to vindicate the
rights of African Americans. By 1937, the Lochner era had clearly ended, but its replacement was uncertain. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 9 (2010).
22
See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term. Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
12 (1972) (noting the emergence in Supreme Court doctrine of “equal protection bite
without ‘strict scrutiny’”); Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987) (documenting the Supreme Court’s
occasional application of heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational basis review).
23
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Part V concludes by discussing the ways in which the history recounted here enriches legal scholarship. I identify lessons for the
study of (1) federalism, including both the “new judicial federalism”
of the Rehnquist Court and today’s so-called “uncooperative
federalism”;24 (2) administrative law, especially administrative constitutionalism; and (3) constitutional law, as applied to the poor.
I
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
AMERICAN FEDERALISM

AND

This Part outlines the emerging literature on administrative constitutionalism (subpart A) and suggests the fruitfulness of connecting
this literature to one of the most important developments in modern
American history: the emergence of “cooperative federalism”25
(subpart B). My historical case study (introduced in subpart C) sits at
precisely this intersection.
A. Federal Agencies and the Making of Constitutional Meaning
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” Chief Justice John Marshall famously proclaimed in Marbury v. Madison.26 At the time, Justice Marshall was
advancing a relatively modest proposition about the Court’s role in
the American constitutional system: “Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”27 A
century and a half later, the Supreme Court went a significant step
further, declaring itself the “supreme” expositor of “the law of the
Constitution.”28
Yet Article III courts, especially the Supreme Court, have never
been able to occupy the field of constitutional meaning-making. First,
as President Andrew Jackson famously observed, the courts lack the
24
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1258–59 (2009) (using the term “uncooperative federalism” to refer to situations
in which “states use regulatory power conferred by the federal government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law”).
25
On “cooperative federalism,” see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
26
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
27
Id. On the modesty of Marbury, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 37–38 (1969) (“There is . . . no doctrine of national,
substantive judicial supremacy which inexorably flows from Marbury v. Madison itself . . . .”).
28
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). This claim continues to spark controversy
among legal scholars. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 221 (2004) (“[J]udicial supremacy was not cheerfully
embraced in the years after Marbury was decided. The Justices in Cooper were not reporting
a fact so much as trying to manufacture one . . . .”); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1553–54 (2005) (providing examples of the
range of legal scholars who have “debat[ed] whether the federal judiciary enjoys interpretive supremacy”).

R
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ability to enforce their interpretations, allowing other actors to fill the
breach (“John Marshall has made his decision,” Jackson supposedly
declared, referencing the controversial Indian law decision Worcester v.
Georgia,29 “now let him enforce it!”).30 Second, the Court is not omnipresent. It cannot and does not grant certiorari in all cases involving
federal constitutional meaning.31 Third, some constitutional violations do not, in practice, have a judicial remedy. Note the slew of
doctrines that constrain the exercise of judicial power. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” (demanding injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability) limits the exercise of federal jurisdiction
to “cases” and “controversies” between proper parties.32 Even where
standing exists, the justiciability doctrines—mootness, ripeness, and
the political question doctrine—may counsel the exercise of restraint.33 And for cases that are “confessedly within [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” the Court has developed doctrines to avoid the
unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions.34 Factor in the

29
31 U.S. 515 (1832). Worcester was one of the Court’s first attempts to grapple with
the place of American Indian polities in the nation’s constitutional structure; it also implicated the constitutional question of the day: the respective powers of the states and the
federal government. President Jackson’s refusal to enforce the Court’s decision amounted
to a rejection of the judiciary’s exclusive authority to give meaning to the Constitution. In
this, Jackson was not alone. For example, President Lincoln famously rejected the legal
basis for the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and refused to
apply the decision outside “that particular case.” 6 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 5, 9 (1896).
30
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. HIST. 519, 519 (1973) (emphasis omitted) (quoting HORACE GREELEY,
THE AMERICAN CONFLICT: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, 1860–’65, at 106 (1866)) (internal quotation marks omitted). On whether
Jackson actually said as much, see DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 412 n.2 (2007) (noting that “the story rests on
a recollection long after the fact” but “is consistent with Jackson’s behavior and quite in
character”).
31
The Supreme Court grants certiorari in a minuscule number of cases. See David C.
Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition
Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 237, 240 (2009). Note, too, that of the cases the Court accepts, most come from
the federal courts of appeals rather than state courts. See Statistics: Circuits,
SCOTUSBLOG.com, http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (noting that in this past Term, only six of the Court’s seventy cases came from state courts). As
a result, “state courts continue to hold and to exercise substantial authority on issues of
federal constitutional law.” Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 979, 980 (2010).
32
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
33
On political questions, see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993). On
mootness, see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974). On ripeness, see Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
34
See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (listing the canons of constitutional avoidance).
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Court’s traditional aversion to “advisory opinions”35 and one sees just
how often the Court declines opportunities to espouse constitutional
meaning. In these situations, other actors may fill the vacuum.
The recent literature on administrative constitutionalism marries
insights about the federal judiciary’s limitations with observations
about the day-to-day interpretive work of the nation’s administrative
agencies—bodies “whose existence is barely hinted at in the
Constitution,” but which are now so numerous, established, and important as to constitute a “fourth branch” of government in many
scholars’ eyes.36 The administrative constitutionalism literature starts
from the realist insight that in the twenty-first-century United States,
“most governing occurs at the administrative level and thus that is
where constitutional issues often arise.”37 Administrators regularly interpret and enforce (or decline to enforce) the Constitution.
Through such actions they may dictate the fate of constitutional
claims and shape future ones, for example, by coloring popular understandings of the Constitution’s guarantees or by preventing constitutional questions from reaching the judiciary. Similarly, their actions
may inform future judicial interpretations of the Constitution or distort applicable doctrine.38 In other words, administrative constitutionalism is not simply about conscious efforts on the part of
35
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (discussing the origin and theory behind
the prohibition on advisory opinions).
36
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575 (1984). This emphasis on the “fourth branch” is what
distinguishes administrative constitutionalism scholarship from an older body of scholarship on “the Constitution outside the courts.” On the latter, see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 776–82 (2003) (offering numerous
historical examples of constitutional interpretation by Congress and the president). The
literature on constitutional interpretation within the executive branch is particularly thick.
See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 27 (2007)
(“The judicial authority to interpret the Constitution is neither absolute nor stable.”);
David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 116
(1993) (arguing that the executive branch is free to interpret the Constitution
autonomously).
37
Metzger, supra note 13, at 1898. A vast sociological literature on “street-level bureaucrats” makes a similar point but does not engage explicitly with administrators’ constitutional interpretations. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS
OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 3–25 (30th Anniv. Expanded ed., 2010) (documenting the often vast decision-making power of low-level administrators). The same distinction holds true for the literature on agency “nonacquiescence” with judicial rulings.
See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989) (describing and evaluating “[t]he selective refusal of
administrative agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals”).
38
See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1935. On how agencies might prevent a court from
considering a constitutional question, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox
of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501,
508 (2005).
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administrators to avoid violating the Constitution—an obvious and
unobjectionable concern—but about the intentional and unintentional ways in which they “elaborate[ ] and implement[ ]” “constitutional meaning”39 as they go about carrying out their statutorily
delegated obligations.
Contemporary examples abound. In her recent synthesis of the
field, Gillian Metzger cites the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
recent decision, in the face of obvious First and Fifth Amendment
concerns, to require that tobacco companies include graphic warnings about smoking-related health risks when marketing cigarettes;
the Office of Legal Counsel’s 2011 determination that the President’s
Article II powers permitted him to commit U.S. forces to the NATO
military campaign in Libya, without prior approval from Congress (arguably contradicting Congress’s Article I power to declare war); and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 2013 rule
prohibiting housing practices that “actually or predictably result[ ] in
a disparate impact” on protected groups or that produce or reinforce
“segregated housing patterns” (an interpretation of the Fair Housing
Act but also arguably an interpretation of the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection).40
To date, however, much of what we know about the consequences
of administrative constitutionalism comes from a handful of discrete
historical examinations. Sophia Lee, for example, has shown how administrative actors in the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in the 1960s and early 1970s used the constitutional “state action doctrine” to persuade private employers to adopt equal employment rules—cautiously at first and then insistently, using the full force
of the agency’s investigatory, regulatory, and adjudicatory powers.41
At the time, it was unclear whether the doctrine actually covered such
actors—that is, whether their conduct was even subject to challenge
under the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The FCC continued in this vein
even after the D.C. Circuit struck down its equal employment rules.43
The FCC story is more interesting still when paired with another finding: at the same historical moment, Lee argues, administrators in the
now-defunct Federal Power Commission interpreted the state action
doctrine to mean that they should not implement equal employment
policies (i.e., they declared private employers beyond the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment).44 By contrasting the conduct of actors in
39

Metzger, supra note 13, at 1901.
Id. at 1897–98; Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,479–82 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
41
See Lee, supra note 13, at 811–44.
42
See id. at 810, 834.
43
See id. at 872–73.
44
See id. at 848–52.
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these two administrative bodies, Lee shows how agencies have “imaginatively extended or retracted, . . . diverged from, and even contradicted courts’ constitutional doctrine” in the important arena of equal
employment rulemaking, creating a variegated constitutional landscape for employers and employees to navigate.45
Reuel E. Schiller’s historical work on administrative censorship
offers another example. Prior to World War II, he finds, courts regularly deferred to administrative regulation of speech in several broad
classes of cases, including, for example, state regulation of public fora
speech and federal regulation of the mails and radio.46 In the absence of judicial interference, agencies defined the practical protections of the First Amendment in these arenas.47 The situation
changed during the War, Schiller argues, when concerns arose about
all potential encroachments on democratic forms of government,48
but a basic and important insight remains: courts do not occupy every
field of constitutional interpretation; in some cases, agencies have
functioned as the primary expositors of constitutional norms, and
their interpretations have had enduring consequences.49
Standing on this solid but relatively narrow foundation, legal
scholars have proceeded eagerly to normative concerns. As Metzger
notes, agencies occupy an “ambiguous constitutional space,” “[t]hey
lack direct electoral accountability,” and much of their work is
45
See id. at 804. Lee’s work on the NLRB has produced similar findings. In the
post-World War II period, Lee shows, the NAACP turned to courts and agencies to vindicate workers’ civil rights, advancing novel theories about the constitutional obligations of
employers, unions, and the NLRB itself. See Sophia Z. Lee, Hot Spots in a Cold War: The
NAACP’s Postwar Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948–1964, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 327, 328–30,
337 (2008). One notable result was a Board-rendered constitutional interpretation (in
Hughes Tool, 147 NLRB 1573 (1964)) that was “out ahead” of the interpretations of both
Congress and the Supreme Court. Id. at 329–30. For more on the NLRB’s engagement
with the constitutional doctrines governing the American workplace, see SOPHIA Z. LEE,
THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT 11–115 (2014).
46
Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 5.
49
For other historical examples, see ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 13, at
30–32 (arguing that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, attorneys working for the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in light of their own understanding of the Equal Protection Clause’s applicability
to pregnancy discrimination, anticipating by several years the Supreme Court’s decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)); GOLUBOFF, supra note 21, at 111–73 (arguing that a
particular understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments animated the work of the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Section (CRS) in the 1940s; documenting how
the CRS helped revive and in fact expand the Thirteenth Amendment as a meaningful
source of protection for black workers); Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status,
and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1181 (2014) (showing how at the turn of the
twentieth century, administrative decisions regarding the constitutional status of Puerto
Ricans percolated into lower courts, ultimately ripening into the constitutional doctrine of
territorial nonincorporation).
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obscure or inaccessible to outsiders.50 Critics have also accused agencies of “tunnel vision,” an impulse towards self-aggrandizement, and
vulnerability to interest group capture.51 Given these concerns,
should steps be taken to limit administrative constitutionalism, or
should it instead, as Metzger and others suggest, be “embrace[d] and
encourage[d]”?52
Without denying the importance of these normative questions, I
believe that the field still needs more empirical work (which I define
as not simply quantitative analyses of data but any methodologically
disciplined research based on observation or experience). To be sure,
such research has limits: even the richest empirical work could be said
to “reveal[ ] the world through a glass, darkly.”53 But without it, “the
lawmaker and the scholar know fearfully little, and much of that is
wrong.”54 What we make of administrative constitutionalism as advocates and policymakers—and what we do with this phenomenon as
scholars (a topic to which I return in Part V)—should turn not on
assumptions but on concrete evidence. To that end, this Article aims
for depth over breadth: it focuses on one federal agency and analyzes
that agency’s interpretation and articulation over time of a single constitutional commitment.
B. Federal Agencies in the Age of Cooperative Federalism
My chosen focus also provides a means of exploring two legal developments that ought to be studied in tandem (and not merely
through doctrine): the rise of a robust federal administrative state and
important changes in the theories and practices of American
federalism.55
Scholars of administrative law often classify agencies on the basis
of structure or design. Most salient to them is “the formulation and
specification of the controls that Congress, the Supreme Court and
50

Metzger, supra note 13, at 1901.
Id. at 1919.
52
Id. at 1916. With caveats, Metzger favors administrative constitutionalism, on the
theory that for all agencies’ limitations, they are better than courts at balancing constitutional concerns with Congress’s goals and choices. Id. For other responses to the normative questions, see ESKRIDGE, JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 13, at 18 (describing administrative
constitutionalism as a natural and desirable way of “develop[ing] and express[ing] our
foundational institutions and norms”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (characterizing administrative constitutionalism as a useful mechanism for adapting the Constitution to changing circumstances and
therefore a crucial supplement to judicial constitutionalism).
53
Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical Scholarship and
American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 60 (2006).
54
Id.
55
Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law and the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2022,
2026 (2008) (“[T]he relationship between federalism and federal administrative law remains strangely inchoate and unanalyzed.”).
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the President”—the three branches of government named in the
Constitution—“may exercise over administration and regulation.”56
This focus stems from historical and ongoing concerns about agencies’ place in the nation’s constitutional system: Are agencies legitimate? If so, why?57 To the extent that scholars are interested in what
agencies actually do, they tend to focus on two functions, to the exclusion of others: rulemaking (the quasi-legislative function) and adjudication (the quasi-judicial function). These are the functions specified
in the landmark Administrative Procedure Act (1946) (APA)58 (which
arose from that same basic concern about agencies’ place within the
nation’s constitutional and political system).59
Scholars of administrative law pay less attention to a different,
crucially important function: that of administering federal-state
grants-in-aid. The vigorous use of grants-in-aid (essentially, subsidies)
is a hallmark of what political scientists in the 1930s dubbed a “new
federalism” and what scholars since then have labeled “cooperative
federalism.”60 Intergovernmental cooperation was by then hardly an
56
Strauss, supra note 36, at 579. Such controls include the process for selecting and
removing an agency’s leaders, the vulnerability of agency decisions to veto by other entities, the source of agency funds, the method by which those funds are replenished, and so
on.
57
See Jerry L. Mashaw, The American Model of Federal Administrative Law: Remembering the
First One Hundred Years, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 975, 977 (2010) (“[A]dministrative law
concerns itself with the internal structures and procedures that are required for legitimate
administrative action.”).
58
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
59
See generally JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE
POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 1–14 (2012) (describing the historical circumstances that
inspired and shaped the APA).
60
On the history of federalism, see, e.g., MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE COMPOUND
REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001) (exploring the nature of America’s federal system, with a focus on the changes that accompanied progressivism, the New Deal,
and the modern civil rights movement); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 113–34 (1987) (tracing change—and continuity—over time in the main
features of America’s federal system); DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 19–177 (2012) (tracking developments in American federalism from the
founding to the twenty-first century); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and Legal Process: Historical and Contemporary Analysis of the American System, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 633, 675–83 (1979)
(compiling and analyzing generations of scholarship on the “historical dimension” of
American federalism). Federalism’s constitutional life—that is, its embodiment in constitutional doctrine—has its own history. See, e.g., Alison L. Lacroix, The Interbellum
Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 (2015) (examining the evolution of the spending power to conclude that constitutional federalism is
not fixed); Logan Everett Sawyer III, The Return of Constitutional Federalism, 91 DENV. U. L.
REV. 221, 221 (2014) (documenting and explaining “[t]he return of federalism to a prominent and hotly contested place in constitutional jurisprudence”); Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–49 (2004) (comparing the two models
of federalisms utilized by the Rehnquist Court). On “new federalism” and “cooperative
federalism,” see JANE PERRY CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM: FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–11, 187–258 (1938) (coining the term “new federalism” to
describe the changed nature and degree of federal-state cooperation in the first three de-
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innovation, but the first decades of the twentieth century witnessed a
new degree of interconnectedness, a more empowered federal government, and an increased willingness on the part of state and local
lawmakers to allow the federal government (or at least its money) into
areas of governance that once seemed to fall squarely within states’
jurisdiction. The New Deal solidified this change.61 Between 1900
and 1930, the combined amount of federal grants to states rose from
$2.8 million annually to over $100 million; by fiscal year 1946–1947,
the estimated annual total exceeded $1 billion. This money quickly
became a significant part of state budgets. In the early years of the
Depression, federal grants covered less than 2% of state and local expenditures; by 1950, that figure was closer to 9%.62 And the use of
grants did not stop there. President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
programs, many of which remained on the books for decades (e.g.,
Medicaid), caused another steep jump in federal grant sums: from a
sum of $9 billion in 1958 to $23.9 billion in 1970.63
Today grants-in-aid are a mainstay of American governance. In
fiscal year 2012, the federal government distributed $455.27 billion in
grant money to states and localities,64 accounting for 31.2% of total
cades of the twentieth century); KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE:
CONGRESS AND THE NEW FEDERALISM, 1877–1929 (2007) (cataloguing “new federalism”-type
reforms and showing that they date back to the late nineteenth century); V. O. KEY, JR.,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATES 206–64 (1937) (discussing the role of
the “cooperating state agency” in the administration of federal grants to states); Edward S.
Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950) (describing “the changed
attitude of the [Supreme] Court toward certain postulates or axioms of constitutional interpretation” that the author associates with “dual federalism” and its embrace of positions
favoring the centralization of power). Federalism scholars today recognize the endurance
of federal-state collaboration, but some question whether the word “cooperative” remains
apt. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics:
The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014) (arguing that the degree
of federal-state integration is now so high that federalism, as we know it, has given way to “a
form of nationalism”); Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998
(2014) (using the phrase “national federalism” to describe today’s federal system); Abbe R.
Gluck, Instrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law
in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 538 (2011) (recognizing that much of today’s federal-state cooperation follows directly from statutory incentives and directives).
61
Harry N. Scheiber, From the New Deal to the New Federalism, 1933–1983, in THE NEW
DEAL LEGACY AND THE CONSTITUTION: A HALF-CENTURY RETROSPECT, 1933–1983, at 1–10
(1984).
62
George E. Bigge, Federal Grants-in-Aid: A Bulwark of State Government, 13 SOC. SEC.
BULL. 3, 3 (1950); Cecile Goldberg, Development of Federal Grant Allocations, 10 SOC. SEC.
BULL. 3, 4 (1947).
63
Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An American Tradition:
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 269–70 (1996).
64
U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, TABLE 12.1 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF TOTAL OUTLAYS FOR GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 1940–2019 (2013), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. This figure represented 15.4% of federal
outlays and 3.5% of the GDP. Id.
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state expenditures.65 Agencies come into play because those billions
of dollars are not simply deposited in lump sums in state treasuries,
but are distributed via carefully considered allotments, each one
tagged for a specific purpose and attached to specific conditions. The
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) alone, for example, administers 461 grant programs, ranging from the new Affordable Care Act grants to grants for family planning.66 The Department
of the Interior administers 270 grant programs, covering everything
from disaster relief to American Indian educational assistance.67 The
list could go on. The point is that each grant requires management,
monitoring, and daily acts of legal interpretation. Agencies do that
work.
These acts of legal interpretation—including, at times, constitutional interpretation—often escape public scrutiny and judicial review.
Administrative law scholars will think immediately of the Supreme
Court’s famous decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
where the Court reviewed a controversial grant from the Department
of Transportation to the Tennessee Department of Highways,68 but
for every decision of this nature there are thousands that remain in
the shadows. When administrators decide, for example, how to interpret the particular conditions that Congress has attached to a federal
grant or whether a grant recipient’s actions conflict with those conditions, these decisions may not be “final” under the APA, especially
when administrators frame decisions as suggestions rather than mandates. Administrators may thus circumvent the APA’s demands for
transparent decision making and may also elude oversight by the
courts.69 An agency’s decision to stop the flow of federal dollars to an
65
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT: EXAMINING
FISCAL 2010–2012 STATE SPENDING 2 (2012), available at http://www.nasbo.org/publica
tions-data/state-expenditure-report/state-expenditure-report-fiscal-2010-2012-data.
66
CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, Agencies: Department of Health and
Human Services, https://www.cfda.gov/?s=agency&mode=form&tab=program&id=0bebbc3
b3261e255dc82002b83094717.
67
Agencies: Department of the Interior, CATALOG OF FED. DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, https://
www.cfda.gov/?s=agency&mode=form&tab=program&id=b8765976b02cee3a384dec3de
1edf2a0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
68
401 U.S. 402 (1971). The decision is famous among administrative law scholars for
its articulation of the standard of judicial review in cases challenging agency actions.
69
In this, the administration of grants-in-aid is not unique. Intentionally or not,
agencies routinely escape the procedural requirements of the APA, for example, by issuing
“guidance” documents instead of rules. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1391–92 (2004) (explaining that, in practice, agencies
may often choose between promulgating a legislative rule, which will be subject to the
notice-and-comment requirements of the APA, and issuing a guidance document, which
will not); Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents,
119 YALE L.J. 782, 792, 806, 820–21 (2010) (finding that between 1996 and 2006, the ratio
of guidance documents to legislative rules was significant, but concluding that concerns
about agencies’ strategic use of guidance documents are overwrought); cf. Edward Rubin,
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existing grantee may be subject to judicial review (this question has
spawned confusion over the past fifty years, owing to its entanglement
with evolving understandings of sovereign immunity),70 but in practice such decisions are few and far between.71 It is in the interest of
both federal administrators and state grantees to resolve conflicts
before they reach the defunding stage. All this is to say: if we seek to
deepen our understanding of administrative constitutionalism and its
implications, a major grant-administering agency is a good place to
start.
C. Welfare Administration as a Case Study
An agency involved with grants-in-aid for public welfare is an
ideal object of study—and not just because legal scholars have devoted relatively little attention to welfare administration.72 Of the
It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95,
96–100 (2003) (noting that the APA is dramatically out of step with what agencies actually
do).
70
See Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and
Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 624 (2003) (discussing
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988), in which “the Court held that the District
Court had jurisdiction to review the government’s refusal to reimburse Massachusetts for
its Medicaid expenditures,” and the confusion among lower courts in the wake of the
decision).
71
Cases such as NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), represent a different, but
related type of challenge to grants-in-aid: plaintiffs allege that in creating a particular
grant, Congress overstepped its constitutionally delegated powers. Id. at 2580; see also
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209–12 (1987) (holding that Congress did not exceed
its powers by enacting a law that withholds federal highway funds from states that allow
individuals under twenty-one years of age to purchase alcohol).
72
Many legal scholars examined welfare administration between the late 1960s and
mid-1980s, as the Supreme Court grappled with a stream of welfare rights cases and their
aftermath. See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 492–500 (1966) (examining problems with contemporary efforts to
judicialize welfare administration); Jerry L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818, 821–37 (1971) (documenting how five Virginia welfare departments administered AFDC); Robert L. Rabin,
Implementation of the Cost-of-Living Adjustment for AFDC Recipients: A Case Study in Welfare Administration, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1143, 1149–63 (1970) (analyzing a 1967 amendment to the
AFDC title of the Social Security Act and the role of HEW in implementing that amendment); William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198, 1200–22 (1983) (describing the “formalization, bureaucratization, and proletarianization” of welfare administration in the 1960s and 1970s); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 2–28 (1985) (contrasting New Deal
jurisprudence on welfare administration with jurisprudence from the 1960s and 1970s).
Since then, however, the field has been relatively thin. Important exceptions include
Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122
YALE L.J. 314, 355–79 (2012) (discussing how federal administrators used rights language
as an administrative tool in the late 1930s and 1940s); Matthew Diller, The Revolution in
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1121, 1145–86 (2000) (examining the model of administration that has dominated welfare
since the 1996 welfare reform); James A. Krauskopf, The Administration of Public Assistance,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 883, 887–96 (1995) (describing the nature of welfare administration
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major categories of grants that emerged in the first decades of the
twentieth century, during the birth of modern “cooperative federalism,” grants for welfare were arguably the most significant. In 1937,
just after the enactment of the Social Security Act, federal aid for
highways ($317 million) overshadowed that for welfare ($155 million), but within just two years, the situation was reversed.73 By 1943,
state receipts for welfare ($389 million) were more than double those
for highways ($164 million).74 (By comparison, state receipts for agriculture, an early area of federal funding, amounted to only $28 million.)75 For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947, grants for the
categorical public assistance programs alone—that is, not including
the full slate of federal-state health and welfare programs—constituted 57% of the total federal aid awarded to the average state.76
Public assistance grants were also significant because of the burdens they carried with them. One burden was fiscal: under the Social
Security Act, states received these grants on a matching basis, meaning
a state got nothing if it spent nothing, and it got more if it spent more
(up to a statutorily prescribed maximum). State legislators responded
rationally, by spending their own funds on public assistance, but they
also demonstrated a keen awareness of the distorting effect of federal
incentives.
A related burden was ideological. The Social Security Act allowed
states great discretion over benefit levels and eligibility requirements—Southern senators would have blocked the Act had it been
otherwise77—but some of the “strings” attached to the federal grants
represented a sharp break with states’ traditional approach to poverty.
Historically, poor relief was a local function: local overseers of the
poor decided who deserved aid, how aid would be given, and what
would be demanded of the recipient in return. The Social Security
Act, by contrast, demanded uniform, statewide rules and centralized
state administration. As interpreted by federal administrators, the Act
also severely curtailed the freedom of local authorities. States that
circa 1994 and discussing potential implementation and administration problems of proposed welfare reforms).
73
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID 38 (1949).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 81.
77
Southern senators feared that if poor African Americans received adequate assistance from the government, they would not be willing to work for low wages in fields and
homes. Accordingly, they insisted that states have the power to determine benefit levels
and eligibility restrictions (with a few exceptions). ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE
COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 51–56 (1998). On the power of
Southern Democrats in Congress during this period, see Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger &
Daniel Kryder, Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933–1950, 108. POL. SCI.
Q. 283, 283–92 (1993).
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wanted federal reimbursements could delegate administration to local
authorities, but state officials had to ensure, for example, that local
administrators gave poor claimants relief in cash rather than “in kind”
(clothes, grocery orders, etc.), and that applicants had an opportunity
to appeal unfavorable decisions. Public assistance grants thus burdened states in a way that highway grants, for instance, did not.78
A final burden involved oversight. Public assistance grants
funded ongoing programs, not one-time projects (they were “formula
grants” rather than “project grants”). In the public assistance context,
this translated into continual monitoring. Federal administrators
stopped short of supervising state officials, but they issued guidance
documents, conducted regular audits, and imposed strict reporting
requirements.79 Much of this oversight, importantly, was not subject
to the participatory requirements of the APA. Not until the late 1960s
were the provisions of the federal Handbook of Public Assistance—the
most authoritative source of federal guidance to states—formally
promulgated as regulations.80
By the late 1960s, federal public assistance grants had transformed the way that states cared for their poor citizens, including
those who had long occupied subordinate positions in local hierarchies. As Martha Derthick has demonstrated, federal grants helped
produce more liberal and inclusive policies, significantly less local variation, more centralized policymaking, and greater bureaucratization
and professionalization of administration.81 Precisely how these
grants produced such sweeping change is less clear. Constitutional
interpretation by federal administrators, I argue, is a crucial piece of
the puzzle. This same puzzle piece also helps us understand how we
arrived at a very different place by the late twentieth century, in which
welfare policymaking had been largely devolved to the states, agencies
had grown accustomed to more rigorous congressional and judicial
oversight, and legal advocates had lost nearly all hope of establishing
robust constitutional protections for the poor.

78
See generally Karen M. Tani, Securing a Right to Welfare: Public Assistance Administration and the Rule of Law, 1935–1965 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Pennsylvania) (on file with Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania) (examining the
administration of public assistance between the New Deal and the War on Poverty).
79
Id. at 181.
80
St. John Barrett, The New Role of the Courts in Developing Public Welfare Law, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1970).
81
DERTHICK, supra note 17, at 193–94.
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II
ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION IN MID-CENTURY
WELFARE ADMINISTRATION, 1936–1953
This Part draws on original archival research to recover a concrete and powerful example of administrative constitutionalism: interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause82 in the administration of
federal-state public assistance programs in the decades after the New
Deal.
A brief explanation of the agency in question: In 1935, as part of
President Roosevelt’s slate of reforms for a depression-ridden nation,
Congress enacted the Social Security Act. This sweeping piece of social legislation not only created a national system of old-age insurance
(Social Security) but also established generous grants for specific state
welfare programs. To administer the Act, Congress created the Social
Security Board, an independent agency. In 1939, as part of the
Roosevelt Administration’s efforts to organize a burgeoning mass of
executive agencies (and also to protect vulnerable New Deal programs
against conservative retrenchment), the Social Security Board came
under a new “umbrella” agency: the FSA.83 In 1953, the FSA became
the HEW and the agency was elevated to cabinet-level status.84
For Social Security Board lawyers, leading actors in this Article,
these organizational changes were largely cosmetic. When the FSA
subsumed the Social Security Board, the Board’s Office of the General
Counsel did not disband; it simply became General Counsel for the
entire FSA.85 More importantly, for purposes of this Article, none of
this restructuring affected the day-to-day work of the lawyers who
82
During this same era, federal administrators also advanced their own interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which, in their view, animated the
Social Security Act’s fair hearing requirement. See, e.g., infra note 88 (discussing Social
Security Board attorneys’ arguments that the fair hearing provision implicated due process
rights). As with their Equal Protection interpretation, their Due Process interpretation
anticipated positions that the Supreme Court would not take until the late 1960s. See
Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Welfare State: An Historical Case
Study (June 2014) (a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Policy History Conference) (on file with author).
83
Reorganization Plan No. 1, § 202, 53 Stat. 1423, 1425 (1939); Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency,
1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009). There was one other significant change along
the way: in 1946, another executive reorganization renamed the Social Security Board the
Social Security Administration and altered the leadership structure, from a three-member
board to a single commissioner. Reorganization Plan No. 2, 53 Stat. 1423, 1424–26 (1946).
84
See DERTHICK, supra note 17, at 22.
85
Tani, supra note 72, at 316 n.1. Between 1939 and 1953, and again between 1961
and 1969, the FSA/HEW General Counsel came from the Social Security Board. Fowler
Harper (1939–40), Jack Tate (1940–47), and Alanson Willcox (1961–69) all hailed from
the Social Security Board. Eisenhower appointee Parke Banta was the sole outsider. OGC
Key Personnel Archive of Former General Counsels, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ogc/personnel/ogcarchive.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
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reviewed and monitored state public assistance programs. For the actors most involved and invested in interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause, there was continuity.
This Part proceeds in three stages. In subpart A, I argue that
from the outset, federal agency lawyers brought the Equal Protection
Clause to bear on their work with state welfare programs. Between
1936 and 1946 these lawyers developed a coherent understanding of
what that clause required (they embraced a nondeferential rationality
model for reviewing state laws and policies) and circulated it within
the agency. The following subparts trace administrative equal protection and its development into the late 1940s and early 1950s. In this
era the agency sought—and failed—to strengthen its authority to enforce the Constitution’s equal protection guarantees (subpart B), but
nonetheless boldly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment in a dispute
with Arizona and New Mexico (subpart C). The dispute led to federal
court, where a district court judge accepted the agency’s constitutional interpretation, but an appellate court ordered the case dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, effectively insulating
administrative equal protection from judicial review.
A. Interpreting the Social Security Act in the Shadow of the
Constitution
The practice of interpreting the Social Security Act in the shadow
of the Constitution86 dates back at least to 1936, when the Social Security Board was a brand new agency. In February of that year, agency
lawyer Sue S. White invoked the Constitution in a memo discussing
whether states applying for grants-in-aid under the Act were allowed
to exclude American Indians living on reservations from their federally subsidized welfare programs.87 Certainly not, she answered: the
text of the Social Security Act was less than clear on this issue, but in
86
I borrow the shadow metaphor from Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s
landmark article, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law. “Divorcing parents do not bargain . . . in a vacuum[,]” the authors famously argued; “they bargain in the shadow of the
law[,]” as each side understands it. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Similarly, federal
administrators interpreted the Social Security Act in the shadow of the Constitution, as
they understood it. For all the Constitution’s ambiguity, this higher law helped define the
range of interpretive possibilities that federal administrators considered.
87
Memorandum from Sue S. White, Att’y, Soc. Sec. Bd., to Thomas H. Eliot, Gen.
Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd. (Feb. 5, 1936) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/10).
Throughout this Article, “NARA II” refers to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland. “HEW Records” refers to the General Records of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Federal Security Agency. Citations
to documents on file with NARA II are given in the form [Records group number]/[Entry
number]/[Box number], in conformity with the National Archives’ record-keeping system.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN403.txt

846

unknown

Seq: 22

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-APR-15

12:40

[Vol. 100:825

her view, such a plan would run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment.88
White cited no legal authority for her position, and her confidence is curious. In 1936, the Supreme Court had yet to adopt strict
scrutiny for classifications based on immutable traits; existing precedents treated racial segregation as consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment.89 Nor did the Equal Protection Clause come up in congressional hearings on the Social Security Act.90 In fact, as many
scholars have noted, aspects of the Act (e.g., the decentralized structure of the public assistance titles, the absence of a federally defined
standard of need, the exclusions of domestic and agricultural workers
from social insurance) appeared to make concessions to the racial hierarchies that existed out in the states.91
Ultimately, White urged a more cautious approach to the potential equal protection violation, lest the agency expose itself to accusa-

88
Id. On Sue White’s background, see Karen M. Tani, Portia’s Deal, 87 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 549, 557 (2012). Another early example comes from an April 1936 memorandum by
Assistant General Counsel Jack B. Tate: Tate insisted to the Board’s leadership that although public assistance benefits were the creations of statute and thus could be eliminated “by the mere exercise of the legislative will,” individual applicants were “entitled to
due process and equal protection of the laws.” Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, Assistant
Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd., to Soc. Sec. Bd. 1 (Apr. 27, 1936) (on file with NARA II, SSB
Records, 47/13/95). Throughout this Article “SSB Records” refers to the General Records
of the Social Security Board.
89
Justice Stone’s famous “footnote four,” in which he suggested heightened scrutiny
of legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities, was still two years away. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
90
Social Security Act: Hearings on H.R. 7260 Before the Subcomm. on Fin., 74th Cong.
(1935) (no mention of “equal protection” or “Fourteenth Amendment”). Interestingly,
there is one reference to “equal treatment,” but not in the part of the hearings dealing
with the Act’s public assistance titles: Senator (and future Supreme Court Justice) Hugo
Black (D., Alabama) asked lawyer Thomas Eliot, one of the Act’s drafters, to clarify the
meaning of a provision in Title V, dealing with grants to states for Services for Crippled
Children. Id. at 88. To receive federal funding, the provision read, a State plan must
“provide such methods of administration . . . as found by the Chief of the Children’s Bureau to be necessary for the efficient operation of the plan.” Id. at 87. (The public assistance titles contained similar language, as Black may or may not have noticed.) See id. at
60, 79, 166. “Would [that provision] not give to the Federal Government the right to say
what kind of hospitals the children should be taken to . . . and how they should be taken
care of . . . ?” Senator Black asked. Id. at 87. “In other words, would it not go further than
simply giving the Federal Government the right to require that all types and classes of
people should receive equal treatment . . . ?” Id. at 88 (emphasis added). Eliot clarified that
the provision related to “administration only.” Id.
91
See, e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 44–45 (2005) (explaining how
Southern representatives in Congress, who then occupied key committee positions, tailored the Social Security Act to funnel money towards their states with a minimum of
disruption to racial hierarchies); LIEBERMAN, supra note 77, at 29–30 (explaining that without the noted concessions, the Act threatened to undermine white supremacy).
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tions of “assuming judicial functions”92—a veiled reference to
conservative critiques of agency decision making.93 But starting
around 1940, another agency lawyer made equal protection something of a personal crusade. As I have written elsewhere, Assistant
General Counsel A. Delafield (A. D.) Smith and his agency colleagues
had a strong interest in characterizing public assistance payments as
rights rather than gratuities.94 They viewed gratuities as the stuff of an
archaic “old poor law” system, incompatible with the New Deal’s modern, rational approach to public assistance.95 As time went on and
federal officials confronted the resilience of traditional relief-giving
practices, the principle of equal treatment became an important point
of contrast. Federal administrators described payments under the old
system as variable, unpredictable, and often discriminatory. The Social Security Act, Smith wrote in 1940, could not be more different: it
“stipulate[d] that each individual shall be entitled as a matter of right
to the uniform application of the State’s criteria of eligibility and standard of need.”96
As this quotation and other writings suggest, Smith believed that
the Social Security Act incorporated an “equal treatment” principle,97
even if it did not say so explicitly. (The language quoted above comes
not from the statute but from the agency’s interpretation of the statute.)
Like White, however, Smith also believed that a constitutional guarantee of equal protection governed the agency’s work. He hinted at this
in a 1939 memo about the permissible bases for classification in
92
Memorandum from Sue S. White, Att’y, Soc. Sec. Bd., to Thomas H. Eliot, Gen.
Counsel, Soc. Sec. Bd. 9 (Feb. 11, 1936) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/10).
Strong action on this issue would come only after the war, in response to pressure from
American Indians themselves. See infra Part II.C.
93
The most famous example is Roscoe Pound, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 331 (1938). Lurking in the background, too, was the
Roosevelt Administration’s desire to shield New Deal social and economic legislation from
searching judicial review.
94
Tani, supra note 72, at 321–22.
95
Id. at 319.
96
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Principal Att’y, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Fed.
Sec. Agency, to Gertrude Gates, Chief, Div. of Plans and Grants, Bureau of Pub. Assistance
1 (Feb. 14, 1940) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/25). Smith referred here
to the Social Security Act’s requirement that a state plan “provide that it shall be in effect
in all political subdivisions of the State”—not exactly the “stipulation” he suggested. 42
U.S.C. § 1352 (2012). The only other statutory language that plausibly related to equal
treatment was language precluding a state from imposing “[a]ny citizenship requirement
which excludes any citizen of the United States.” Id. Legislators seem to have understood
this clause as a prohibition on state laws that discriminated against new citizens in favor of
older citizens. See S. REP. NO. 74-628, at 29 (1935) (“A person shall not be denied assistance on the ground that he has not been a United States citizen for a number of years, if
in fact, when he receives assistance, he is a United States citizen.”); H.R. REP. NO. 17-615, at
18 (1935).
97
A. Delafield Smith, Elements of the Judicial in Security Programs, 17 SOC. SERV. REV.
424, 425 (1943).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN403.txt

848

unknown

Seq: 24

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

27-APR-15

12:40

[Vol. 100:825

federally subsidized state welfare plans: the Social Security Act said
nothing about classification, and yet clearly, Smith wrote, states
should not be permitted to differentiate one needy citizen from another on the basis of hair color, skin color, “religious predilections,”
or “any basis of grouping that is not germane in some degree to the
problem at hand.”98
Smith’s invocation of constitutional equal protection (an invocation that would be repeated many times over in the coming years) is
notable not only because of the absence of statutory support but also
because his interpretation gave the Equal Protection Clause considerably more “bite” than did contemporary judicial decisions. As Victoria
Nourse and Sarah Mcguire have argued, “equal protection arguments
were alive and well at the turn of the twentieth century”99—a favorite
(or in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s memorable words, “the
usual last resort”) of those who sought to resist state regulation.100
But those arguments rarely succeeded: unless the challenged legislation was “without any reasonable basis, and therefore purely arbitrary,” it would survive judicial review.101 Equal protection arguments
tended to prevail only “when a strong liberty interest was at stake,”
such as a man’s right to work. 102 Starting in 1938, the Supreme Court
hinted at an equal protection revival, but as of the early 1940s, that
revival had yet to materialize.103 A. D. Smith clearly had different
ideas, at least when it came to agency review of state statutes.
Smith circulated his thoughts about equal protection more widely
in 1941. Welfare administration regularly raised “equal-protection-ofthe-law” questions, Smith wrote in an article in the Social Service Review.104 Could a state agency exclude a person on account of time
already spent on the relief rolls or because the person’s parents were
98
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Principal Att’y, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Fed.
Sec. Agency, to Geoffrey May, Assoc. Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance 4 (Dec. 20, 1939) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/18). This was a clear invocation of constitutional
equal protection. See Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 262 (1925) (“The equal protection clause does not require absolute uniformity . . . . The state . . . may classify persons on
bases that are reasonable and germane having regard to the purpose of the legislation.”).
99
V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection,
58 DUKE L.J. 955, 975 (2009).
100
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
101
Nourse & Maguire, supra note 99, at 983 (quoting Johnston v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 248 F. 407, 413 (9th Cir. 1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102
Id.
103
See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
that in the future the Court might give “more exacting judicial scrutiny” to “legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation” and to legislation directed at “discrete and insular minorities”). Only later would legal scholars trace the Court’s modern equal protection jurisprudence back to “footnote four.” GOLUBOFF, supra note 21, at 45.
104
A. Delafield Smith, Judicial Trends in Relation to Public Welfare Administration, 15 SOC.
SERV. REV. 242, 256–57 (1941) (citations omitted).
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aliens? Revisiting an old issue, could a state agency exclude
Indians?105 Since these were all instances in which state officials
treated one category of persons differently from another, they all
called for equal protection analysis. Smith also noted that for many of
those affected, administrators—not judges—were their best hope:
“When all is said and done,” Smith predicted, “justice for the majority
of individuals affected by these laws will be sought finally and authoritatively before [an] administrative tribunal.”106
The lawyers’ references to equal protection grew more frequent
and forceful during the war years, as voices from across the political
spectrum touted equality, fair treatment, and the “rule of law” as quintessential American values.107 The beauty of the Social Security Act,
Smith explained in a 1943 article, was that it assured every American
that “his case will not rest in the discretion of the administrator but
upon the basic guaranties of (1) the right to equality of treatment and
(2) apt and legally approvable procedures for compelling the satisfaction of that right”—in other words, “ ‘equal protection’ and ‘due process.’ ”108 This change—this shifting poor relief into a constitutionally
protected zone—would support Americans’ “sense of security” and
“attitude of self-reliance” in these troubling times, Smith argued, and
thereby build “the morale of our succeeding generations.”109
For the same reasons, agency lawyers in the mid-1940s became
more vocal about the violations of equal protection that, in their view,
continued to pervade state-level welfare administration. Smith’s 1946
article in the Social Security Bulletin (a reprint of a speech delivered at
that year’s National Conference of Social Work) went beyond identifying equal protection “questions” to signaling outright disapproval of
laws that “classified our [needy] children in terms of the sins of their
parents”—that is, the parents’ immigration status, spending choices,
sexual behaviors, and so on.110 Smith considered such classifications
105
Id. at 258 (citations omitted). Smith was inclined to agree with White on this issue.
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Principal Att’y, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec.
Agency, to Geoffrey May, Assoc. Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance (May 31, 1940) (on file
with NARA II, SSB Records, 47/13/92).
106
Smith, supra note 104, at 259.
107
See generally DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 24
(2006) (“If fascism meant arbitrary government, the United States stood for due process
and the rule of law.”); EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 235–72 (1973) (noting a shift in democratic theory
in the decades following World War II, as intellectuals eagerly differentiated the United
States from its totalitarian counterparts around the globe).
108
Smith, supra note 97, at 425.
109
Id. at 425–26; see also id. at 426 (“Economically and socially, the sense of security
requires the knowledge that what we obtain we obtain as of right and as an equal before
the law.”).
110
A. Delafield Smith, Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and Freedom of the Individual, 9 SOC. SEC. BULL. 6, 7 (1946).
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constitutionally impermissible, for, in terms of need (the legally relevant characteristic), the child of the “sin[ful]” parent was no different
from the child of the innocent one.111
Anticipating a point that the constitutional law scholar Jacobus
tenBroek would famously raise in the mid-1960s,112 Smith also objected to the way that state laws created a special set of requirements
for poor Americans. Under the generally applicable public laws,
Smith explained, “[y]ou may buy . . . what you wish or enjoy”; you may
be “immoral” or “idle[ ]”; if you are a laborer, you may go on strike; if
you are a child, you may live in peace, so long as your home does not
violate certain “objective standards” of health and safety. Through
welfare laws, however, state and local officials enforced different standards on the poor: Through economic sanctions, they deterred adults
from engaging in legal but undesirable behaviors. Through “suitable
home” restrictions, they targeted living environments that, under the
generally applicable law, were no cause for concern. “[T]his,” Smith
scolded, “is not equality in any legal sense.”113 Smith’s boss, General
Counsel Jack B. Tate, articulated similar concerns in a 1946 speech to
the agency’s field staff. State laws that excluded children from public
assistance because they lived with a relative of a different religious
faith, for example, or because they were not the products of “legitimate” unions, were “of course plainly unconstitutional.”114
Judicial support for this interpretation remained thin. As late as
1949, leading constitutional law scholars described the Supreme
Court’s application of the Equal Protection Clause as “halting, indecisive, and unpredictable.”115 Tate himself conceded that “no close legal precedents” supported his views.116 Courts did not give searching
111
Id. Only in the late 1960s would the Supreme Court embrace this reasoning. See
infra note 318.
112
Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and
Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964) (Parts I & II); California’s Dual System of Family
Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) (Part III).
113
Smith, Community Prerogative and the Legal Rights and Freedom of the Individual, supra
note 110, at 7.
114
Jack B. Tate, Remarks at the Field Staff Conference 23, 25 (1946) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/75) (emphasis added).
115
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 380 (1949).
116
Tate, supra note 114, at 24. The most favorable language probably came from the
1941 Supreme Court case Edwards v. California, in which the Court struck down a
California law criminalizing the transport of indigent nonresidents into the state, but the
majority based its decision on the Commerce Clause, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See
314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941). Not until the mid-1950s, in the criminal defense context, did the
Court begin to use the Equal Protection Clause to strike down state laws that unfairly burdened the poor. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that “when
an indigent is forced to run this gauntlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to
appeal does not comport with” the Fourteenth Amendment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 13–26 (1956) (finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation where a state denied a
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consideration, Tate explained, to matters “described as charitable or
eleemosynary” (if public benefits were a gift, the beneficiary could
hardly complain about the amount received or the manner of treatment). Meanwhile, assistance recipients had not pressed the issue for
“fear [of] being thought ‘uncooperative’ ” by those with control over
their livelihoods. Perhaps Congress would someday clarify the legal
status of public assistance payments. Until then, Tate urged, it was up
to administrators to “distinguish between individuals only on a rationally apt and constitutional basis,” to remove conditions that subjected
the individual to excessive public control, and (without irony) to
“guarantee the individual his proverbial day in court.”117
B. A Brush with Congress
By late 1946, top people in the federal grant-administering
agency118—not just the lawyers and other mid-level administrators—
agreed that states with approved welfare programs ought to be assuring “equal treatment of individuals in similar circumstances.”119 The
precise way forward was less clear. The softest approach, which the
agency pursued starting that October, was persuasion: “[W]herever
appropriate,” the agency’s Bureau of Public Assistance directed its
regional directors, they should recommend to state officials ways to
“strengthen[ ] statutory provisions affecting the right to assistance and
defendant’s criminal appeal solely on the basis of his inability to pay for a trial transcript).
A decade later the Court would apply a similar analysis in the voting rights context. See
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–70 (1966) (holding that a poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause); see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140–49 (1972)
(striking down system of election filing fees on equal protection grounds). And in the
early 1970s, a number of Justices would characterize the poor as a “suspect class,” sufficient
to trigger strict scrutiny of laws that treated them differently. See James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 144–45 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting, in a case involving public
approval of low-income housing projects, that classifications based on wealth merited strict
scrutiny); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 385–86 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(opining that as applied to low-income persons, filing fees in divorce cases violated the
Fourteenth Amendment). As a body, however, the Supreme Court has consistently refused
to embrace that interpretation. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (reiterating
that the “Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification” (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971))); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973) (holding that the poor as a “disadvantaged class is not
susceptible of identification in traditional terms”). In any case, Smith and Tate were writing at a time when lawyers could only speculate about how the Court would apply the
Constitution to the poor. For an up-to-date overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence in
this area, see Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An
Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 410–19 (2010).
117
Tate, supra note 114, at 24–25, 38.
118
The Social Security Board was by this point the Social Security Administration,
which was nested within the FSA. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
119
Memorandum from Jack B. Tate, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Watson B.
Miller, Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency, 9 (Oct. 8, 1946) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records
235/40/11).
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equitable treatment of individuals.”120 Such a piecemeal strategy,
however, would take time to bear fruit. Thus administrators considered two other strategies: (1) an amendment to the Social Security
Act, which would explicitly require states to adhere to the constitutional requirement of equal protection; and (2) a favorable court
opinion. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, amidst a burgeoning civil
rights movement, they pursued both.
In the spring of 1948, A. D. Smith decided to “spark” a conversation about equal protection.121 “The thinking has heretofore been in
the negative, i.e. forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, creed
or color,” Smith explained to a colleague in advance of the annual
meeting of the agency’s regional attorneys. He proposed to “approach the matter positively—as the Constitution does—and think . . . of
assuring that the benefits of the grant-in-aid programs are made
equally available to all.”122 The statements that Smith circulated to
the entire regional attorney cohort elaborated: Many of the problems
with contemporary social legislation, Smith explained, stemmed from
“failure to legislate and operate under the equal protection of the laws
principle,” which he understood in rationality terms.123 “[Y]ou have
to define the scope of your objective” and then “carry thru,” by allowing the statutory objective alone to guide differences in treatment.124 Laws that made public assistance turn on subjective moral
judgments, laws that maintained the “tradition of discretion” that had
long haunted the administration of poor relief—all these might give
way in the face of a more robust application of the equal protection
principle.125
120
Memorandum from Jane Hoey, Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance, to Reg’l Dir., Fed.
Sec. Agency (Oct. 11, 1946) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/30).
121
Letter from A. D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Louis
Shneider, Reg’l Att’y, Fed. Sec. Agency (Apr. 20, 1948) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records 235/40/75).
122
Id. (emphasis added). The use of the word “positive” may seem curious, given that
the Equal Protection Clause is phrased negatively (as a prohibition on particular exercises
of state power), but by 1948, federal government officials often spoke of equality in affirmative terms. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS
3–10 (1947) (discussing the government’s obligation to secure Americans’ rights, including the right to “equality of opportunity” in employment, housing, education, health care,
and public services and accommodations).
123
On the rationality model of equal protection and its alternatives, see Robin West,
Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45,
52–62 (1990).
124
A. D. Smith, Equal Protection of the Laws Principle, Apr. 27, 1948 (on file with NARA
II, HEW Records 235/40/75).
125
Id.; see also Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec.
Agency, to All Reg’l Att’ys, Fed. Sec. Agency, 3–4 (Apr. 29, 1948) (on file with NARA II,
HEW Records 235/40/75) (noting various “problems and oddities in classification” that he
had observed, such as denials of ADC on the ground that a parent refused to undertake a
surgical operation, or participate in a training course, or institute a criminal support action
against a family member).
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There was one glaring problem: How could federal administrators enforce this equal protection principle, especially at a time when
judicial support was lacking?126 One option was to secure commitments from state legislatures to, first, observe the principle, and second, “characteriz[e] . . . the . . . [welfare] program as one dealing with
rights such as are concededly subject to review under the equal protection
clause.”127 With such clear statements, courts would be free to scrutinize the practices of state and local welfare administrators (i.e., such
scrutiny would not read as dangerous Lochner-type judicial activism).128 Many states, of course, did not want to guarantee equal protection to their needy citizens, which is why Smith pushed a second
option: that Congress amend the Social Security Act to condition each
state’s federal funds on the state’s commitment to equal protection.129
Smith’s proposal may have sounded radical to some, but it was
not a pie-in-the-sky idea. Only months before, in October 1947,
President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights recommended that
Congress condition “all federal grants-in-aid and other forms of federal assistance” on the absence of discrimination and segregation.130
“Apropos the current civil rights discussion,” the General Counsel’s
office recommended Smith’s proposed reform to administrators at
the very top of the federal social welfare bureaucracy.131
The proposal had several advantages, Alanson Willcox explained
in March 1948. (Willcox, the New Deal lawyer spotlighted in the Introduction, succeeded Tate as General Counsel in 1947.) The first
was that “it would frame the [discrimination] issue in the sweeping
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than in terms of race and
color.”132 (The Supreme Court had not yet interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause as a presumptive prohibition on racial classifications.)133 Another was that the proposal could be implemented
without a dramatic expansion of agency power: the federal agency
would simply withhold grants until states guaranteed their
126
Smith cited a number of cases in an attempt to bolster his argument, but none
pertained to welfare payments. Smith to All Reg’l Att’ys, supra note 125, at 1–2.
127
Smith, supra note 124, at 2 (emphasis added).
128
Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to All
Reg’l Att’ys, Fed. Sec. Agency (May 3, 1948) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/
75).
129
Smith, supra note 124, at 2.
130
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 122, at 166.
131
Memorandum from Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Oscar
Ewing, Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency (Mar. 15, 1948) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records 235/
40/48); Memorandum from Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Donald
Kinglsey, Assistant Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency (Apr. 9, 1948) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records 235/40/48).
132
Willcox to Ewing (Mar. 15, 1948), supra note 131, at 1.
133
Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV.
213, 216–17 (1991).
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commitment to equal protection. Should a state subsequently violate
its pledge, a court could resolve the issue.134 Perhaps most important,
Willcox argued, the proposal would vindicate the nation’s “democratic pledge of equality”135—so vital in the Cold War context—by refuting “[t]he too common thought . . . that the State may give to one
and withhold from another in its unfettered discretion.”136
Within a year, a version of Smith’s proposal appeared before the
House Ways and Means Committee, as part of the agency’s suggested
revision of the Social Security Act. (“[D]eterminations of eligibility
for and amounts of assistance . . . shall be made on bases which, within the
area served, will assure to every individual the equal protection of the
laws . . . .”)137 But if legislators were aware of administrative equal
protection, members of this Committee expressed no interest in placing it on firmer ground, not even if the Act promised judicial rather
than administrative vindications of the “equal treatment” guarantee.
When offered a substitute provision, providing that state-level fair
hearings would be “subject to judicial review to assure due process and
equal protection of the law,” the Committee rejected it, reportedly out of
concerns about a “multitude of [court] suits.”138 In the wake of the
Vinson Court’s recent racial discrimination decisions and amidst
ongoing NAACP litigation campaigns,139 the Southern-dominated
Committee may well have had something to fear.140
C. A Brush with the Courts
The failure of legislative reform did not, however, weaken the
agency’s commitment to equal protection. In their dealings with
states, federal officials continued to raise the issue on their own. The
most notable example is the agency’s response to two states’ contin134

Willcox to Ewing (Mar. 15, 1948), supra note 131, at 1–2.
Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to John
L. Thurston, Assistant Adm’r for Programs, Fed. Sec. Agency (Nov. 5, 1948) (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/48).
136
Willcox to Ewing (Mar. 15, 1948), supra note 131, at 1.
137
H.R. 2892, 81st Cong. § 1407(a)(8) (1st Sess. 1949) (emphasis added).
138
J. Meyers, Notes from Regional Attorneys’ Conference, Oct. 19, 1949 (on file with
NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/75) (emphasis added).
139
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (holding that state court enforcement of restrictive covenants that exclude persons of color from ownership or occupancy
of real property is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Sipuel v. Board of Regents,
332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) (per curiam) (holding that the state must conform with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and allow qualified persons of color
access to legal education at state institution as readily as applicants of any other group). See
generally Whittington B. Johnson, The Vinson Court and Racial Segregation, 1946–1953, 63 J.
NEGRO HIST. 220, 221–27 (1978) (examining the Vinson Court’s record on civil rights).
140
LEE J. ALSTON & JOSEPH P. FERRIE, SOUTHERN PATERNALISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1865–1965, at 45–46
(1999).
135
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ued exclusion of reservation Indians from the states’ federally subsidized public assistance programs. This dispute, which lasted for
nearly two decades, would ultimately allow the agency’s equal protection interpretation to surface in federal court.141
The example requires a brief digression: In the early days of the
Social Security Act, the federal agency persuaded most states that public assistance should be available to Indians on the same terms as everyone else. The lawyers believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
dictated this result,142 but in communications with the states, administrators chose not to disclose the legal basis for their position. During
the depths of the Great Depression, they did not need to: the mere
suggestion that the agency would withhold federal money was
enough—at least for most states. Arizona and New Mexico, the two
states with the largest populations of reservation Indians, refused to
give in so easily.143 After learning the agency’s policy, the two states’
legislatures enacted public assistance programs that purported to satisfy federal requirements and therefore received federal funds; later,
at the implementation stage, state and local administrators excluded
Indians from coverage.144
For the next five years, obfuscation at the state level and political
negotiations in Washington left most Indians in the two states (both
on reservation and off) locked out of public assistance programs.145
Federal administrators were aware of the states’ discriminatory practices and disapproved of them, on both statutory and constitutional
grounds.146 But agency leaders agreed “to let sleeping dogs lie,”
according to Arizona Senator Carl Hayden—a member, not coincidentally, of that body’s powerful Appropriations Committee.147
141
For earlier examples, see Memorandum from Edward J. Rourke, Office of Gen.
Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Reg’l Dir., Region 3, Fed. Sec. Agency (June 14, 1944) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/70) (noting two previous occasions in which the
Social Security Board refused to approve state plan material “on the ground that the contemplated action would violate the Constitution of the United States”).
142
See supra note 87.
143
Karen M. Tani, States’ Rights, Welfare Rights, and the “Indian Problem”: Negotiating Citizenship and Sovereignty, 1935–1954, 33 LAW. & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with
author).
144
Id. at 14–15.
145
By 1938, the Social Security Board had disturbing data on the dearth of Indian
public assistance recipients in the two states, but out of consideration for the two states and
for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, agency leaders awaited a legislative solution before pressing the issue. None was forthcoming. Arizona Senator Carl Hayden regularly proposed
amending the Social Security Act to provide complete federal financing for all Indian public assistance claims, but without support from Interior Department officials, he repeatedly
failed. Id. at 14.
146
Id. at 12.
147
Letter from Carl T. Hayden, U.S. Senator, to Harry W. Hill, Comm’r, Ariz. State
Dept. of Welfare (Oct. 23, 1939) (on file with the Arizona State University Libraries Arizona Collection, Carl T. Hayden Papers, 1851–1979, Box 699).
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Starting in the 1940s, however, Indians in the two states began to
press for inclusion, using compelling wartime rhetoric. By 1947, a coordinated campaign was afoot. The National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI), a recently formed pan-Indian organization, encouraged reservation Indians in Arizona and New Mexico to apply for
public assistance. Via two well connected former Interior Department
lawyers, Felix Cohen and James Curry, the NCAI then forwarded evidence of discrimination and inaction to allies in the Social Security
Board. This activism gave the federal agency the ammunition and
motivation it needed to initiate the process of formally sanctioning
the two states. (The sanction—complete defunding—was so severe
that although administrators frequently alluded to it, they rarely used
it. By the early 1960s, it was known as the “nuclear option” in agency
parlance.)148 Ultimately the two states avoided losing their grants
only by formally committing, in April of 1949, to treating Indian public assistance applicants the same as all others.149
This series of events matters for two reasons. First, when we look
beneath the surface, we see that the agency’s “equal treatment principle” was more than just talk: it informed negotiations with the states
and helped inspire the risky step of confronting them.150 Consider,
for example, A. D. Smith’s November 1947 response to an internal
request for legal analysis: he explained that the actions of the two
Southwestern states not only violated the Social Security Act, but also
implicated “the basic constitutional issue of equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.”151 This was not simply because of racial discrimination, Smith emphasized. The two states
would likely claim that they had merely distinguished “wards” of the
federal government from nonwards. But given the states’ ostensible
purpose—providing for needy citizens—their distinction had “no
logic” unless the federal government was actually fulfilling the needs
of all Indians in the states, a claim for which there was no evidence.152
In August 1948, in the midst of a series of conferences with state offi148
On the “nuclear option,” see Notes from Conversation with Frances White (May 25,
2014) (on file with author).
149
Tani, supra note 143, at 23.
150
Risky because such action could provoke political backlash, which might manifest
itself in reduced appropriations.
151
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Jane
M. Hoey, Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance, 2 (Nov. 21, 1947) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records 235/40/7).
152
Id.; see also Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec.
Agency, to Oscar Ewing, Adm’r, Fed. Sec. Agency (Dec. 10, 1947) (on file with NARA II,
HEW Records 235/40/11) (reporting to the head of the agency that the GC’s office prepared “a statement of the current situation and included a discussion to the effect that
arbitrary denial of assistance is violative of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
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cials, Smith prepared a similar statement for Social Security Administrator Arthur Altmeyer. Again, constitutional equal protection
informed Smith’s sense of the agency’s obligations. “Suppose . . . that
some State should suddenly stop paying all negroes, jews and catholics
[sic]. How could a federal official sworn to observe the Constitution
of the United States certify funds under such conditions . . . ?” Smith
asked.153
Whether constitutional arguments swayed state officials to adjust
their policies is unclear. (The more likely explanation is their appreciation for their limited political power, combined with Congress’s
eventual bestowal of a higher-than-normal federal matching rate for
payments to reservation Indians.)154 What is clear is that federal administrators’ understanding of the Constitution, combined with civil
rights activism outside the agency, affected administrators’ perception
of their role and their willingness to wield politically risky financial
sanctions. It also shaped their response to the legal challenge that
Arizona filed against the agency shortly thereafter.
That lawsuit is the second reason that this administrative skirmish
matters: unsatisfied with the administrative resolution of the Indian
inclusion issue, Arizona officials looked for an opportunity to sue the
federal agency; the suit, in turn, allowed the agency to advance its
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation in federal court.
The opportunity arrived in 1950, when Congress amended the
Social Security Act to include a new category of public assistance: Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).155 The structure
was the same as for the programs authorized by the 1935 Act: states
that wished to take advantage of federal financial support created
state-specific plans; federal administrators checked these plans against
statutory requirements, and if appropriate, disbursed funds.156 The
APTD law that the Arizona legislature enacted in the spring of 1952
explicitly denied assistance “to any person of Indian blood while living
on a federal Indian reservation.”157 When federal administrators re153
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to
Arthur Altmeyer, Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. 2 (Aug. 12, 1948) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records 235/40/79). It was not a hypothetical question: just a month later, in September
1948, Felix Cohen and two colleagues responded to the agency’s inaction by filing suit on
behalf of eight Indians involved with the NCAI campaign, alleging deprivation of the plaintiffs’ civil rights; they withdrew the lawsuit the following June, only after the agency initiated hearings and state officials formally agreed to revise their position. Tani, supra note
143, at 4–5.
154
Tani, supra note 143, at 26; Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec.
351, § 1401 64 Stat. 477, 555 (1950).
155
See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 351, §§ 1401–05, 64 Stat.
477, 555–58 (1950).
156
Id.
157
Tani, supra note 143, at 26.
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fused to authorize federal funds, Arizona sued to compel agency approval (Arizona v. Hobby).158 If the gamble paid off, the judiciary
would both curb the federal agency’s authority and reject its legal interpretations.159 For their part, agency lawyers had long hoped for
the chance to win judicial support for the equal protection principle.
“[W]e should miss no opportunity,” A. D. Smith wrote to one of his
regional attorneys in late 1947, “of urging the conception of social
programs as the constitution of legal rights in which the usual legal
guarantees of due process and equal protection of law are applicable
and of the reasons behind this view.”160 Arizona’s lawsuit gave them
that chance.
The agency’s interpretation of equal protection received its
first-ever public airing on February 20, 1953, when District Court
Judge Henry A. Schweinhaut considered the Government’s motion to
dismiss the case.161 In accordance with federal law, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) represented the agency in court, but two agency attorneys (including General Counsel Alanson Willcox) appeared alongside Assistant United States Attorney Ross O’Donoghue. The
arguments that O’Donoghue presented were consistent with opinions
that had long circulated inside the agency. For example, although the
government could have defended its actions without reference to the
Constitution, O’Donoghue characterized Arizona’s APTD plan as in
conflict with both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection
Clause. The framing of the equal protection argument was also consistent with the agency’s. Arizona had created a classification based
on race, O’Donoghue explained to Judge Schweinhaut, and tried to
salvage it by adding a classification based on residence (on a federal
reservation). In light of the purpose of the statute (providing aid to
needy and disabled individuals), neither classification was proper, and
nothing proper could be “created by adding together [the] two
negatives.”162
After hearing from Arizona’s lawyer, as well as from Felix Cohen
(representing amici curiae the Association on American Indian Affairs
and the Hualapai and San Carlos Apache tribes), Judge Schweinhaut
found in favor of the government and dismissed the case.163 His brief
oral opinion was a victory for administrative equal protection.
158

Arizona v. Hobby, No. 2008–52 (D.D.C. dismissed Feb. 20, 1953).
Tani, supra note 143, at 26–27.
160
Memorandum from A. D. Smith, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Fed. Sec. Agency, to Reg’l
Att’ys, Fed. Sec. Agency (Oct. 30, 1947) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records 235/40/75).
161
Transcript of Oral Argument, Arizona v. Hobby, No. 2008–52 (D.D.C. Feb. 20,
1953) (on file with the Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.,
Association on American Indian Affairs Records 1851–2008, Box 328, folder 21).
162
Id. at 6.
163
Id. at 28.
159
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Schweinhaut, a Franklin D. Roosevelt appointee, had come to the federal bench after serving as the first chief of the DOJ’s new Civil Liberties Section (commonly known by its subsequent appellation, the Civil
Rights Section) and had presumably thought much about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.164 Schweinhaut was not persuaded, as Cohen had argued, that Arizona intended to discriminate
against Indians on racial grounds; the intended classification was between wards of the government and nonwards. Yet this seemingly
more benign classification was constitutionally impermissible, he implied, and the agency was correct to find it so: “I think the Administrator
could not, constitutionally, or under the terms of the statute, itself,
probably . . . approve [Arizona’s] plan . . . .”165 In other words, the
agency acted legally and properly when it scrutinized the Arizona legislature’s chosen classifications and when it rejected Arizona’s plan on
constitutional grounds.
As it turned out, this important finding would remain hidden
from public view. In granting the government’s motion, Schweinhaut
“put aside jurisdictional questions,”166 but the appellate court to
which Arizona turned next was not so inclined. On May 13, 1954, a
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss it. “[T]he purpose of [Arizona’s] suit
[was] ‘to reach money which the government owns,’ ” Judge David L.
Bazelon explained, meaning that it implicated the doctrine of sovereign immunity; the Complaint offered no statutory or constitutional
basis for avoiding that doctrinal bar.167 The decision had troubling
implications for states: if other federal courts agreed, state officials
were not entitled to judicial review of administrative interpretations of
the Constitution—interpretations with very high stakes.

164
On the work of the Civil Rights Section in the 1930s and 1940s, see GOLUBOFF,
supra note 21, at 111–40.
165
Transcript of Oral Argument, Arizona v. Hobby, supra note 161, at 28.
166
Id.
167
Arizona v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (quoting Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 375 (1945)). Sovereign immunity doctrine appears
considerably more complicated today. See supra note 70; see also Katherine J. Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, ‘Accident,’ and Policy in the Development of Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 767 (2008) (“[C]ourts have gone from
strictly construing the doctrine to creating a sort of common law, ‘penumbral’ sovereign
immunity that extends well beyond what are normally considered to be the doctrine’s
boundaries.”); Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2003) (“‘[S]overeign immunity’ . . . has never barred all remedies for governmental wrongs, even some remedies that
could affect the treasury or government property.”).
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III
ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE AGE
MASSIVE RESISTANCE, 1954–1963

OF

Fifteen years after the Arizona v. Hobby decision, in 1968, the federal agency would present a different face to state grantees. The Social Security Board (now technically the Social Security
Administration) was by then nested within HEW, a cabinet-level successor to Roosevelt’s FSA. Old New Dealers occupied leadership positions, but as compared to the late 1940s, the agency had taken on a
more conservative cast. The following anecdote exemplifies the
change:
In September of 1968, in the wake of months of racially charged
political turmoil and violence, as well as a dramatic occupation of the
Washington Mall by the Poor People’s Campaign, HEW Secretary
Wilbur Cohen sought legal advice on a pressing matter: HEW’s policy
regarding racially discriminatory actions by the hundreds of state
agencies and institutions to which HEW distributed federal funds.168
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which contemporaries understood as an
effort to vindicate the Fourteenth Amendment, likely spurred
Cohen’s inquiry. Title VI of that Act mandated that “[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”169 The Act authorized HEW, the gatekeeper to billions of dollars of federal funds, to “effectuate” that Title.170 It remained unclear, however, whether HEW could or should
use its power to enforce the Constitution’s commands.171
HEW’s General Counsel, Alanson Willcox, sent back a long reply,
noting that if anything, the “question ha[d] become more urgent”
because of the upcoming reargument before the Supreme Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson, one of a flurry of welfare rights cases before the
168
Memorandum from Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and
Welfare, to the Sec’y [Wilbur Cohen], Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Sept. 13,
1968) (personal collection of Frances White, on file with author).
169
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
170
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000d–1 (1964).
171
See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE
VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 26–27 (1995) (discussing congressional debates over
Title VI, in which differences of opinion emerged about executive branch authority to
enforce constitutional equal protection guarantees in the absence of congressional authorization). Further complicating the picture was Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in
which the Supreme Court read an equal protection guarantee into the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause. The case could be read to imply that HEW itself acted unconstitutionally every time it released federal funds to a program that violated an individual’s constitutional rights.
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federal courts.172 Shapiro involved the constitutionality of several
states’ one-year residence restrictions for receipt of federally subsidized welfare benefits,173 restrictions which an emerging cohort of
poverty lawyers and civil libertarians assailed as outmoded and discriminatory.174 But Willcox’s sense of “urgen[cy]” stemmed from a
different concern: his knowledge of an argument that Professor
Archibald Cox—the former Solicitor General, no less—planned to
raise on behalf of the poor appellees. Although HEW officials had
long expressed sympathy with the appellees’ position,175 Cox’s brief to
the Court implied that HEW should have done even more: “The requirements of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are to be
read into [the Social Security Act] as certainly as if they were incorporated expressly,” Cox insisted; if a state rule complied with the letter of
the statute but violated the Constitution, HEW officials “acted properly” when they disapproved.176
Willcox—the same Willcox who had actively supported administrative equal protection in the 1940s—staked out a more cautious position: in the absence of “authoritative court precedents,” HEW
“should be required to make as few constitutional decisions as possible.” His reasons were pragmatic: “[U]nless supported by fairly explicit court decisions,” he wrote Secretary Cohen, such administrative
decisions could not “go effectively much beyond bland generalizations.” If they did, they would be “unsatisfactory and probably unacceptable,” especially “where there is room for real and rational
difference of opinion, and where the financial and political stakes may
be high.”177
172
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Willcox to Cohen, supra note 168, at 1.
The original argument, in May of 1968, resulted in deadlock. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL
NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 78–79 (1993).
173
Shapiro consolidated challenges to Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of
Columbia statutory provisions that aimed to “deter[ ] the in-migration of indigents” by
denying welfare assistance to residents who had “not resided within their jurisdictions for
at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.” Shapiro,
394 U.S. at 621–22, 631. The Court’s decision turned on its articulation of the “right to
travel,” a rare “fundamental right” under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 630, 638. Because
the state residency restrictions burdened this right, the Court applied a less deferential
standard of review, ultimately concluding that the restrictions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 638.
174
See generally Elisa Martina Alvarez Minoff, Free to Move? The Law and Politics of
Internal Migration in Twentieth-Century America, (Apr. 24, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author) (detailing the legal and political reform of internal migration in the mid-twentieth century).
175
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 124 (“It is ‘a real question’ whether the Constitution
allows the legislatures to impose any residence requirements on applicants for social
benefits.”).
176
Supplemental Brief for Appellees on Reargument at 42–43, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Nos. 9, 33, and 34), 1968 WL 112575.
177
Willcox to Cohen, supra note 168, at 1. In a separate memo, Willcox pled with Cox
to reconsider: Cox’s statements about agency responsibility for constitutional
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In fact, Willcox’s 1968 advice about what HEW should do directly
conflicted with HEW’s own past practices. He ultimately conceded as
much: when it came to public welfare, Willcox admitted, HEW had
repeatedly invoked an “ ‘equitable treatment’ doctrine,” in ways that
“verge[d] on deciding constitutional questions.”178 What happened
between 1953 and 1968 to cause him to bury that history?
Answering this question requires an investigation of the fraught
period between 1954 and 1963, when civil rights occupied the center
of the national stage and major political realignments were underway.
In the face of Republican Dwight Eisenhower’s victory in the 1953
Presidential election and in the wake of the “Dixiecrat Revolution” of
1948, the Democratic Party held together. Feeling white supremacy
under threat, however, Southern Democrats increasingly broke party
ranks to align with conservative Republicans.179 In short, the New
Deal was under stress, especially where it implicated the nation’s internationally recognized “race problem.” Outside Washington, meanwhile, anxiety about federal power abounded. American federalism,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, had long shielded racially discriminatory state and local practices from federal interference.180 No
longer, the Court signaled in Brown v. Board of Education.181 In 1957,
in Little Rock, Arkansas, federal troops made that message clear and
concrete, but resistance continued in both the South and the
North.182
Federal administrators were not insulated from these broader political pressures. At HEW, New Deal liberals continued to populate

interpretation and enforcement would not only impose a “large order” on HEW, but they
would also “work a substantial change” in intergovernmental relationships. Letter from
Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Archibald Cox,
Harvard Law Sch. (Sept. 10, 1968) (personal collection of Frances White, on file with
author).
178
Willcox to Cohen, supra note 168, at 1.
179
IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 389–94
(2014).
180
See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of state segregation laws); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883) (holding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to outlaw racial discrimination by
private entities).
181
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(requiring states “to admit public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis”).
182
On state and local resistance to federal antidiscrimination pressures, see generally
TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–1963 (1989) (providing a narrative history of the modern civil rights movement); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET
LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE NORTH (2009) (updating the history of the modern civil rights movement to include the efforts of ordinary
citizens and activists in the North).
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the “mezzo level,”183 but with the transition to more conservative executive leadership, top positions promptly changed hands.184
There were important changes, as well, in public perceptions of
welfare—perceptions that endured into the 1960s. In the wake of
World War II, federally subsidized welfare programs became entangled in broad changes shaking the nation: the solidification of a robust national regulatory state, the disruption of gender norms, the
mass migration of black Americans out of the South, and the disturbing reality of a wealthy nation with pockets of joblessness. The
ADC program185 was particularly controversial:186 as ADC costs ballooned and the proportion of nonwhite, unmarried mothers on the
rolls grew, many states proposed restrictive amendments to their state
plans, including behavioral requirements, spending restrictions, and
outright prohibitions on aid to “unsuitable homes” (defined in this
era as homes involving illegitimate children or live-in boyfriends).187
In the face of these changes, subpart A shows, federal administrators continued to invoke administrative equal protection in their reviews of state laws, and they continued to affect state policy choices,
but they faced increased resistance. Subparts B and C document two
conflicts, both from the early 1960s, between HEW and state officials.
Subpart B describes the federal agency’s highly publicized dispute
with Louisiana over its racially discriminatory suitable home laws.
Subpart C recovers a lesser known but equally important skirmish with
Michigan over a change to the state’s ADC program. Both incidents
spread the agency’s understanding of equal protection further afield,
including into the hands of an emerging cohort of poverty law activists. Both incidents also affirmed for administrators the need for a
tool like administrative equal protection. But the political fallout,
183
This is Daniel Carpenter’s term for the influential layer of agency personnel below
the top, politically appointed leadership. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 19–21 (2001).
184
Top New Deal administrators were also vulnerable because of the rise of anticommunism and the extensive machinery that developed to root out loyalty-security risks in
government. Enemies of the New Deal used this machinery to depopulate the federal
government of prominent left-liberals. On the political climate in Washington at this time
and how it impacted HEW administrators, see LANDON STORRS, THE SECOND RED SCARE
AND THE UNMAKING OF THE NEW DEAL LEFT 177–258 (2012); Tani, supra note 88, at 566–68.
185
ADC would later become AFDC, see infra note 247 and accompanying text. In
1996, it would be restructured and renamed Temporary Aid to Needy Families.
186
The programs for aid to the elderly, the blind, and the disabled raised general
concerns about welfare fraud and the rise of a massive, bureaucratized “welfare state” but
were less prone to criticism. Tani, supra note 78, at 5–6.
187
See generally WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965) (documenting
how states used “suitable home” policies in the late 1950s and early 1960s to disqualify
potential ADC recipients); ELLEN REESE, BACKLASH AGAINST WELFARE MOTHERS (2005)
(describing resistance against welfare programs from the late 1940s through the 1950s).
On the logic behind many of these laws, see infra note 214 and accompanying text.
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along with civil rights pressures and the era’s broader antiwelfare climate (even amidst the “rediscovery” of poverty in America),188 encouraged administrators to reframe their “equal protection principle”
in precisely the manner suggested by this Part’s opening anecdote.
That reframing is the subject of subpart D. It is also a thread linking
this Part to the next, on the legal campaign for welfare rights.
A. Administrative Equal Protection Meets “Welfare Backlash”
Agency efforts to vindicate equal protection continued in the
Eisenhower era in part because states were doing so many things that
blatantly contradicted the agency’s earlier pronouncements.189 Between 1954 and 1960 at least nineteen states attempted to deny ADC
to illegitimate children.190 In a similar vein, many states proposed
laws conditioning children’s ADC payments on the mother’s behavior:
188
It may seem contradictory to characterize the climate as “anti-welfare” when there
was a surge of interest in fighting poverty, but these two phenomena went hand in hand:
New Deal welfare programs, critics alleged, had produced dependency on government,
which in turn created and sustained intergenerational cycles of poverty. The policy initiatives that comprised the “War on Poverty” represented a deliberate turn away from traditional income support programs in favor of facilitating “opportunity” and supporting
individual and community initiative. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 262–66 (10th ed., 1996); MOLLY C.
MICHELMORE, TAX AND SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 61–65 (2012).
189
See Frances L. White, Equitable Treatment Under the Public Assistance Titles, 9
(1963) (personal collection of Frances L. White) (on file with author) (describing A. D.
Smith’s interpretation of equal protection as “dominant” within the agency during this
time).
190
See Memorandum from the Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV, Dep’t of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, to Office of the Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and
Welfare (July 8, 1954) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73) (Mississippi);
Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare, to Office of the Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (May 7,
1959) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73) (Alabama); Memorandum from
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Health, Educ., and Welfare (Jan. 15, 1959) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/
20) (North Carolina); Memorandum from Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare, to the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare 7 (Mar. 13, 1959)
(on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/20) (South Dakota); Memorandum from
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Health, Educ., and Welfare 8 (Oct. 14, 1959) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/
40/20) (Florida, Louisiana); Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV,
Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the Office of the Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Health, Educ., and Welfare 2 (Mar. 6, 1957) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/
73) (Tennessee); Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and
Welfare, Region V, to the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare 4 (Apr. 4,
1957) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73) (Illinois); Legislative Developments
in the States, 17 PUB. WELFARE 124, 167–68 (July 1959) (Texas, Louisiana). Bell also found
evidence of similar proposals from Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. BELL, supra note 187, at 72.
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her agreement to file nonsupport paperwork,191 establish the paternity of the child,192 cease “illicit” relationships,193 undergo sterilization,194 accept available employment,195 participate in rehabilitative
treatment,196 and submit to fingerprinting.197
Against this onslaught of new and innovative state-level activity,
which historians have described as a wave of welfare “backlash,”198 federal agency lawyers raised statutory objections—and constitutional
ones. When North Carolina considered prohibiting payments to families with more than two illegitimate children, the federal agency informed the state welfare department that the bill would likely violate
the Social Security Act and the Constitution, a message that the state
welfare director conveyed directly to Governor Luther Hodges.199
When Delaware officials considered a bill that would limit a mother to
receiving assistance for not more than two illegitimate children unless
she agreed to be sterilized, agency lawyers made sure that state officials were aware of the “serious legal questions . . . under the equal
191
See Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the
Secretary, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (July 15, 1958) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/40/20) (Illinois); Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region III,
Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and
Welfare (Feb. 5, 1958) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73) (Virginia); Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IX, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to
the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Mar. 3, 1959) on file with NARA
II, HEW Records, 235/40/74) (Washington).
192
See Gen. Counsel to Sec’y (July 15, 1958), supra note 191 (Illinois); Memorandum
from the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare to the Secretary, Dep’t of
Health, Educ., and Welfare (Mar. 14, 1958) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/
20) (Virginia); Loren C. Belknap, An Analysis and Criticism of the Program of Aid to Dependent
Children, 6 J. PUB. L. 25, 42 (1957).
193
See Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (July 15, 1957) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/40/20) (Alabama).
194
See Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to the
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (May 13, 1955) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/40/20) (Delaware).
195
See Legislative Documents in the States, 17 PUB. WELFARE 128 (July 1959)
(Washington); Legislative Documents in the States, 13 PUB. WELFARE 185, 192 (Oct. 1955)
(Missouri); Belknap, supra note 192, at 39 (reporting such policies in 13 states; citing specifically Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, and the
District of Columbia).
196
See Belknap, supra note 192, at 39 (reporting such policies in eleven states; citing
specifically California, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and
West Virginia).
197
See Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Nov. 15, 1957) (on file with NARA II, HEW
Records, 235/40/20).
198
See generally REESE, supra note 187; Sarah A. Soule & Yvonne Zylan, Runaway Train?
The Diffusion of State-Level Reform in ADC/AFDC Eligibility Requirements, 1940–1967, 103 AM. J.
SOC. 733, 740 (1997).
199
ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 77 & n.163 (2009); Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, to Gen. Counsel (Jan. 15, 1959), supra note 190.
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protection clause” that the proposal raised.200 In response to bills in
South Dakota,201 Alabama,202 and Illinois,203 federal administrators
sent similar messages, and although many factors may have prevented
these bills from becoming law, it is notable that none of them did.
We might expect federal administrators to have been even more
bold in this period, in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Brown204 and, later, Griffin v. Illinois.205 Brown, after all, continued the
Court’s post-Lochner reinvigoration of the Equal Protection Clause and
established that the Clause’s meaning must adapt to changing circumstances.206 Griffin, the first of a series of cases recognizing the equal
protection rights of poor litigants,207 equated “discriminat[ion] on account of poverty” with discrimination “on account of religion, race, or
color.”208
In their day-to-day work, however, administrators were discovering the limits of the constitutional concept of equal protection. The
starkest example was Mississippi: alluding to the Constitution simply
was not enough when, within days of the Brown decision, the
Mississippi legislature attached a rider to its 1955 appropriation act
prohibiting assistance payments to any child whose mother had an
illegitimate child after being placed on the assistance rolls. Federal
200
Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, to the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (May 13, 1955). This report also noted that the Delaware bill resembled previously
considered legislation from Georgia and Missouri. Id.
201
See Assoc. Gen. Counsel, to the Gen. Counsel (Mar. 13, 1959), supra note 190 (advising the South Dakota agency that the bill “represent[ed] unequal treatment of children . . . and would raise a question under title IV of unreasonable classification”). I found
no subsequent mentions of the bill in federal agency correspondence or newspaper
searches.
202
See Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV, Dep’t of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare, to Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (May 9, 1956)
(on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73) (informing Alabama officials about the
questions that the Social Security Commissioner raised about Georgia’s similar proposal in
1951; “we assume . . . that the questions were sufficient to discourage the enactment of the
Alabama bill”); Cody Hall, Bills Flood Legislature On 2nd Day, ANNISTON [Al.] STAR, May 10,
1957, at 10 (noting that under state law, unwed mothers could continue to “draw monthly
welfare checks for every illegitimate child, no matter how many”).
203
See Legislative Developments in the States, 15 PUB. WELFARE 130, 151–52 (Oct. 1957);
Editorial, Reforming Aid to Dependent Children, FREEPORT [Ill.] J. STANDARD, Apr. 12, 1957, at
10 (noting that the bill was defeated).
204
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
205
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
206
347 U.S. at 489–95.
207
See supra note 116.
208
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. The potential significance of Griffin for the poor was apparent immediately to observers. See, e.g., Bertram F. Willcox and Edward J. Boustein, The
Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 2 (noting that “for
the first time the Supreme Court has addressed itself squarely to the impact of poverty on
constitutional rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment”). The Burger Court would later reconceptualize the Griffin line of cases as
due process cases. Klarman, supra note 133, at 287.
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agency lawyers warned that the state had thereby established an “unreasonable classification,” jeopardizing its federal grant.209 But legislators showed no sign of changing their minds, and agency leaders
(the new Eisenhower appointees) chose not to take formal action. Instead, the agency’s regional representatives negotiated with the
Mississippi Department of Public Welfare over how it would interpret
the new state legislation. This pragmatic approach produced concessions—for example, the state agency agreed to treat an illegitimate
birth as just one factor in its evaluation of a home’s “suitability”—but
these changes had little meaning for the families that the law
targeted.210
B. Louisiana and Unsuitable Homes
The agency’s conciliatory approach in Mississippi also created a
damaging precedent. In the summer of 1960, using Mississippi’s federally approved plan as a template, Louisiana amended its ADC law to
prohibit payments to any woman who had a child out of wedlock after
receiving a check from the welfare department, unless and until she
presented proof that she had “ceased illicit relationships” and was
“maintaining a suitable home for the child.”211 A law enacted in the
same legislative session denied welfare benefits to an illegitimate child
“if the mother of the illegitimate child . . . is the mother of two or
more older illegitimate children.”212 When the law went into effect,
23,000 children—the vast majority of whom were black—lost their
ADC benefits.213 This disparate impact was no accident: the laws were
209
Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Feb. 14, 1955) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records,
235/40/20); see also Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (June 14, 1954) (on file with NARA II,
HEW Records, 235/40/20) (criticizing the Mississippi ADC provision for being both overand under-inclusive); Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV, to Office of the Assoc. Gen.
Counsel (July 8, 1954), supra note 190 (noting the existence of an illegitimacy provision in
a Mississippi appropriations bill); Memorandum from Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare 10 (Aug. 14, 1956) (on
file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/20) (noting that a Mississippi statute with a “suitable home” provision, as applied, would potentially be unconstitutional).
210
Memorandum from Office of the Reg’l Att’y, Region IV, Dep’t of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare, to Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (June 9, 1954)
(on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/73); Memorandum from Gen. Counsel,
Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare 6 (Jan.
15, 1958) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/20); Memorandum from Gen.
Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (May 14, 1958) (on file with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/40/20).
211
Act of July 7, 1960, No. 251, § 233(D), 1960 La. Acts 527.
212
Act of July 7, 1960, No. 306, § 233(C), 1960 La. Acts 634.
213
Louisiana Drops 23,000 Children on Relief Rolls as Illegitimates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1960, at 62L. For an excellent summary of the Louisiana “suitable home” controversy and
its relationship to broader concerns about federal-state welfare policy, see Lisa Levenstein,
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part of a “segregation package,” designed to countermand federal integration orders, retaliate against African Americans for their civil
rights demands, and undermine state politicians who had blunted segregationist demands.214
The incident produced strong reactions. Editorials in major
newspapers condemned Louisiana’s approach as “mean” and “uncivilized”;215 “not only unjust, but criminal.”216 Louisiana Governor
Jimmie Davis defended the laws in equally strong terms, dismissing
the affected mothers as “a bunch of prostitutes”217 who ran “baby factories for money.”218 On the ground, local churches, community
groups, and civil rights organizations rushed to the children’s aid.
But the most important response, for the purposes of this Article, was
from the Greater New Orleans branch of the National Urban League:
it called on HEW, as the primary source of Louisiana’s public assistance funds, to intervene.219
In outward appearance, HEW proceeded cautiously, warning
Louisiana officials that the state’s new ADC law was the subject of “serious concern.”220 Internally, much stronger language circulated.
“[T]he public assistance titles of the Social Security Act must be read
and administered in the light of Constitutional limitations,” insisted
one HEW lawyer; HEW was obligated to “determine the reasonableness of a[ny] State plan classification” and to cut off funds
where a classification was “Constitutionally obnoxious.”221 Some
From Innocent Children to Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the United States, 1960–1961, 11 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 10 (2000).
214
KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE
CARD AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR 70–71 (2001); see also Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How
Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of
Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399, 423–24 (1997) (“Louisiana’s bill denying welfare benefits
coincided . . . with an increased tendency to disguise discrimination as moral reform.”).
215
Editorial, Sins of the Fathers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1960, at 40.
216
Editorial, Louisiana Relief Rolls, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 5, 1960, at 10.
217
Governor Calls ADC Mothers Prostitutes, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 26, 1960, at 2 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
218
John Corporon, Louisianans Dispute Effect of Cut in Relief for Unwed Mothers, WASH.
POST, Sept. 29, 1960, at A23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219
JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945–1965, at 88–89 (2005).
220
See Letter from Kathryn D. Goodwin, Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance, to Mary
Evelyn Parker, Comm’r, [La.] Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (Sept. 1, 1960) (on file with SWHA,
NSWAR2, Box 53). Throughout this Article, “SWHA” refers to the Social Welfare History
Archives at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. “NSWA2 Records” refers to
the Records of the National Social Welfare Assembly, Supplement 2.
221
Memorandum from Myron J. Berman, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health,
Educ. and Welfare, to Kathryn Goodwin, Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance (Aug. 14, 1959),
cited in White, supra note 189, at 10–11. Berman may have had in mind the Supreme
Court’s 1953 equal protection case Morey v. Doud, in which the Court “caution[ed] that
‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.’” 354 U.S. 457, 464

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-4\CRN403.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 45

ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION

27-APR-15

12:40

869

administrators believed they had the power and the duty, in other
words, to censure the state. The real question was whether the
agency’s more conservative leadership had the will.
In this instance (as in the case of Indian exclusion), civil rights
and social welfare organizations spurred agency action. The September 30, 1960, petition from the National Social Welfare Assembly
(NSWA), a council of leading social work and social welfare organizations, was perhaps the most important. Addressed to HEW Secretary
Arthur Flemming, the petition not only bore the names of the nation’s most reputable charitable organizations, but it also carried the
imprimatur of agency insiders.222 “[P]ersons familiar with the provisions of the Social Security Act and their implementation under law
over the years,” the petition read, believed that HEW had “ample authority” to find Louisiana in violation of the statute and perhaps also
the Constitution.223
A few of those “familiar persons”—such as former Bureau of Public Assistance director Jane Hoey—signed their names, but Secretary
Flemming likely recognized the fingerprints of others. The moving
force behind all the NSWA’s policy positions was Elizabeth
Wickenden, an old New Dealer who enjoyed close friendships with
leading liberals (Abe Fortas and Lyndon Johnson, to name a few) and
high-ranking HEW administrators.224 In fact, it was former Social Security Commissioner Arthur Altmeyer who brought the Louisiana situation to her attention. He urged Wickenden and his old friend
Wilbur Cohen to get involved.225 (Cohen was then a professor at the
University of Michigan, but had worked in the agency for decades
and, as mentioned, would briefly serve as HEW Secretary.)226
Amidst these pressures, Secretary Flemming took the unusual
step (unusual for the Eisenhower years) of publicly threatening to
(1953) (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928)). Other,
more recent decisions, however, would have suggested a less stringent form of review. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 491 (1955) (upholding the
challenged regulation because it bore a “rational relation” to a legitimate objective; observing that “[t]he prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further
than . . . invidious discrimination”).
222
Letter from Clark W. Blackburn, Nat’l Soc. Welfare Assembly, to Arthur Flemming,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare (Sept. 30, 1960) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2
Records, Box 53).
223
Id. (“The Constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under the law would also
appear to be ignored in a policy which arbitrarily excludes from a public benefit a whole
class of children who are otherwise eligible.”).
224
On Wickenden’s background and influence, see STORRS, supra note 184, at 244–50.
225
See Elizabeth Wickenden, Notes on Conversation with Harry Rosenfeld (Nov. 1,
1960) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 53).
226
Cohen became secretary by default, more or less, in 1968, when John Gardner
resigned.
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withdraw Louisiana’s entire $22 million public assistance grant.227 By
mid-October, HEW had scheduled a formal “conformity” hearing for
the state, at which the agency would adjudicate Louisiana’s right to
continue receiving federal funding.228
What happened next suggests how administrative interpretations
of the Constitution may escape the bounds of an agency, and also how
they may work their way back in. With the aid and encouragement of
agency insiders, outside advocates treated the upcoming hearing like
a judicial appeal and began preparing amicus- style legal briefs.229
Jane Hoey circulated a memo to Wickenden and her allies in which
she set forth pertinent sources of legal authority—including the
Constitution.230 Arthur Altmeyer chimed in, insisting that Louisiana
had violated both the Social Security Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.231 Several former attorneys from HEW’s General Counsel’s office, including Willcox (then working for the American Hospital
Association), offered help.232 With federal administrators’ encouragement and assistance, four influential advocacy groups—the ACLU,
Child Welfare League of America, National Urban League, and Family Services Association of America—ultimately submitted briefs.233
Each claimed that Louisiana’s laws failed to conform to the requirements of the Social Security Act—and also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.234 For their part, HEW lawyers avoided any explicit
227
Bess Furman, Flemming Calls Aged Plan Sound, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1960, at 30; see
also Bess Furman, U.S. Seeks to Bar Aid for Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1960, at 42 (“The
department held that Louisiana’s action in cutting 23,000 children off its rolls ‘required
withholding further Federal grants.’”).
228
See Federal Agents Probe Louisiana Child Aid Cut, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1960, at B5.
229
Wickenden, supra note 225.
230
Jane Hoey, Notes, Aid to Dependent Children – Title IV, Social Security Act – Louisiana 1–3 (Nov. 7, 1960) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 53).
231
Letter from Elizabeth Wickenden, Nat’l Social Welfare Assembly, to Shad Polier
(Nov. 4, 1960) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 53).
232
The other two were Harry Rosenfeld and Leonard Lesser. Wickenden, supra note
225.
233
The agency’s stamp was strongest on the ACLU brief, which Willcox prepared.
Wickenden, supra note 231.
234
See Memorandum of the Am. Civil Liberties Union (on file with SWHA, NSWA2
Records, Box 53); Memorandum of the Child Welfare League of Am., Inc. (on file with
SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 53); Memorandum of the Family Servs. Ass’n of Am. (on file
with SWHA, NSWAR2, Box 53); Memorandum of the Nat’l Urban League, Inc. (on file
with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 53). That activists should raise equal protection arguments in the fall of 1960 is perhaps unsurprising: Louisiana’s new welfare laws were as
transparently discriminatory as the Alabama redistricting law that the Supreme Court had
recently struck down in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and the “separate but
equal” public school systems invalidated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). More novel and surprising is the fact that activists mobilized those arguments in
an administrative setting. They seemed to believe that constitutional arguments would have
purchase with agency decision makers. They also may have had their eyes on the courts.
See Wickenden, supra note 225 (“[Rosenfeld] said an adverse decision could certainly be
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mention of the Constitution during the November 1960 hearings. But
they did insist that Louisiana had enacted a “wholly unreasonable and
capricious” eligibility requirement.235 In other words, Louisiana’s laws
would fail even the most minimal rationality review had they been
challenged in court on equal protection grounds.
The agency’s January 16, 1961, decision disappointed the amici—
Louisiana would keep its grant, in light of state officials’ recent steps
to correct “overzealous interpretation and implementation” of their
suitable home laws—but the announcement that Secretary Flemming
issued to accompany the decision vindicated many of the amici’s arguments.236 The Social Security Act authorized the states to impose “reasonable conditions of eligibility,” the Flemming Ruling began.237 Some
conditions were not reasonable—because they were inconsistent with
the “well-ordered system for dispensing assistance” that the Act also
required. (None of this language, to be clear, came from the text of
the Act itself.) Conditions that denied aid to a child solely because of
the conduct of his or her caretaker—such as Louisiana’s “suitable
home” condition—fell into the unreasonable category because they
aimed primarily at correcting the adult’s behavior, not meeting the
child’s need. States were free, of course, to regulate their citizens’
conduct, but they were not free to use the ADC program to impose a
higher standard on the poor. Flemming gave states until July 1, 1961,
to rid their plans of “suitable home”-type requirements. He urged
seven states in particular to take a hard look at their books, and he
promised, even as he turned over the agency’s reins to President John
F. Kennedy appointee Abraham Ribicoff, that specific federal guidance would follow.238
Historians and poverty law scholars know the Flemming Ruling as
a belated but important statement on moralistic state welfare laws. It
bears remembering for another reason, as well: it offers a first glimpse
of how federal administrators began to repackage administrative
equal protection as a statutory interpretation. A “lame duck” after the
appealed to the courts under either the [APA] or the Constitution itself, in which case any
amicus curiae briefs would become a part of the legal record under review.”).
235
Bess Furman, U.S. Seeks to Bar Aid for Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1960, at 42.
236
BELL, supra note 187, at 146.
237
Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Office of the
Sec’y, to the Comm’r of Soc. Sec. (Jan. 16, 1961) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records,
Box 53) [hereinafter “Flemming ruling”] (emphasis added).
238
Id. The states were Georgia, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, Florida, Virginia, and
Michigan. BELL, supra note 187, at 146–47. Federal guidance did follow, as did an amendment to the Social Security Act that lent narrow support to the Flemming Ruling (Congress affirmed the “no suitable home laws” part, but ignored Flemming’s more general
insistence on “reasonable conditions of eligibility”). Aid to Dependent Children of Unemployed Parents Act, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 77. Wilbur Cohen apparently used back
channels to secure this language from Congress. The formal hearings on the bill make no
mention of the suitable home controversy.
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1960 Presidential election, Secretary Flemming was not afraid to make
a statement on the way out, and he had doubts about Louisiana’s actions. When HEW’s top lawyer, Eisenhower appointee Parke Banta,
proved unsupportive,239 Flemming consulted a few lawyers who had
been with the agency longer, such as regional attorney Bernice
Bernstein. Bernstein was intimately familiar with the agency’s position on suitable home policies, its broader commitment to equal protection, and the legal groundings for all of the agency’s work; she had
been around when these principles were first articulated and she used
them often in her dealings with states. (Bernstein also happened to
be close friends with Elizabeth Wickenden.)240 By early January,
Flemming was convinced that Louisiana’s suitable home law violated
the Equal Protection Clause and had decided to say as much.241
The narrower statutory ruling that Flemming ultimately issued
appears to have been the result of a last-minute intervention by Assistant Secretary Rufus Miles, a lifetime bureaucrat and the self-proclaimed “male midwife” of HEW.242 “You propose to take the position
that you are obliged, under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment,” to issue this ruling, Miles wrote Flemming on January 9, 1961,
but did that obligation actually exist?243 Although not a lawyer, Miles
had strong views, especially about the consequences of such a ruling.
For one, he wrote, it could cause citizens “grave apprehension” about
the limits of executive power and its tendency to encroach on the
courts. Would it have been right, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, for HEW to deny federal grants to states that did not
align with the Secretary’s personal understanding of the Constitution?
Clearly not. And what about all the other constitutional questions
that HEW confronted? If the secretary declared suitable home laws
unconstitutional, must he also confront the public hospitals and
universities that maintained racial segregation while receiving federal
grants? If the agency failed to act “with restraint,” Miles predicted,
239
Banta apparently told Flemming that he “wouldn’t know how to go about” defending a defunding decision. Interview by Harlan Phillips with Dr. Arthur S. Flemming in
Eugene, Oreg. 13 (Apr. 25, 1964) (transcript on file with the Columbia Oral History
Archives, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.). Banta’s
private notes suggest that he believed the matter to be one of “fed-state relations,” best
“handled quietly.” Note card on Louisiana public assistance matter (Sept. 1, 1960) (on file
with the State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, Parke M. Banta Papers,
1918–1970, Box 2).
240
On Bernstein’s life and work, see Tani, supra note 88, at 564–69.
241
Memorandum from Rufus Miles, Admin. Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, to the Secretary, Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare (Jan. 9, 1960) (on file
with NARA II, HEW Records, 235/34/219).
242
M.E. Grenander Dep’t of Special Collections and Archives, Finding Aid for the
Rufus Edward Miles, Jr. Papers (1934–1985) available at https://library.albany.edu/spec
coll/findaids/apap048.htm#history (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
243
Miles to the Sec’y, supra note 241.
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Congress would quickly “ ‘clip the wings’ of the Executive Branch.”244
Flemming apparently listened. His January 16 ruling cited the Social
Security Act alone,245 even though the Equal Protection Clause underlay his decision.
C. Michigan and Undeserving Fathers
Three days later, Flemming retired from HEW, narrowly avoiding
the next federal-state welfare controversy. This controversy would
cause administrative equal protection to surface once more, and once
again, the official agency pronouncement would clothe administrators’ constitutional interpretation in statutory garb.
The controversy began with President Kennedy’s welfare reforms—a response to the growing suspicion that New Deal public assistance programs, especially ADC, were not working. As head of
President Kennedy’s transition team on social policy, agency veteran
Wilbur Cohen suggested that the reforms include a temporary extension of ADC to children of unemployed fathers, a program named
ADC-UP. (Up to that point, grants had not been available to children
of two-parent households, unless the father was demonstrably incapable of working.) Bundled with other antirecession measures, ADC-UP
sailed through Congress.246 A year later, Congress reauthorized the
program for five years as part of a larger slate of welfare reforms. The
same legislative package changed ADC to “Aid to Families with Dependent Children” (a blatant and unsuccessful attempt at rebranding);
ADC-UP thus became AFDC-UP.247
Public welfare experts immediately grasped what seemed to elude
legislators: AFDC-UP was an unprecedented (albeit temporary) expansion of federal government responsibility. “Employability” had
long been a main dividing line in America’s system of public welfare
provision. Adults who were categorically “unemployable,” by reason
of old age, disability, or sole responsibility for a child, were proper
subjects of federal beneficence; state and local governments retained
responsibility for everyone else, on the theory that local authorities
were better qualified to judge need, deservingness, and the amount of
pressure necessary to make a capable adult choose work over relief.
AFDC-UP blurred this distinction by extending AFDC payments
(which by 1950 supported not only the child but also the caretaker
relative) to a subset of the “employable” poor.248 It also moved the
244

Id.
Flemming ruling, supra note 237.
246
MITTELSTADT, supra note 219, 109–12.
247
Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a), 76 Stat. 172,
185–86 (1962) (emphasis added).
248
MITTELSTADT, supra note 219, 112–13.
245
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federal government one step closer to a complete takeover of poor
relief.249 The launch of AFDC-UP, in other words, was ripe for
conflict.
The site of one such conflict was Michigan, where voters had just
elected moderate Republican George Romney, a “self-made” businessman with “magazine ad charm” who professed disdain for partisan
squabbling and promised to restore power to individual citizens.250
Once in office, Romney made a point of tackling issues that had deadlocked others.251 AFDC-UP was one. Democratic state legislators had
twice tried to pass legislation allowing Michigan to participate in the
program, but were blocked by conservative Republicans from rural
districts.252 Romney came into the first session of the legislature with
a compromise bill in hand, drafted by a veteran state welfare
administrator.253
What opponents feared, Romney understood, was an open-ended
program that would run away with state funds and, more important,
would capture counties’ general relief clients. The significance of
general relief was twofold. First, it kept local welfare agencies in business. After the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, when
most states rushed to claim federal grants, Michigan counties jealously
guarded their autonomy. The state legislature ultimately created a
separate bureaucratic structure to administer the new federally subsidized programs rather than force local operations to conform to federal standards,254 and that separate structure had endured.255
Second, general relief preserved local authorities’ power over poor,
able-bodied residents. AFDC-UP, with all its federal rules and requirements, was a threat. It did, however, offer cash-strapped localities a
249

Id.
See Marquis Childs, Romney’s Backers Look to the Future, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1963, at
A14 (noting Romney’s “ambitious plans for making over the state government and
Michigan’s Republican party”); Robert D. Novak, Rambling Romneyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
1962, at 12 (identifying “distrust of the great power groupings in modern America” and
the necessity of “broad-based citizen participation” as basic tenets of “Romneyism”).
251
See Three for ‘64: G.O.P. Hopefuls Make Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1963, at 14.
252
Push Federal Aid Program, HOLLAND [MICH.] EVENING SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1963; Old
Arguments Flare in Senate on ADC Proposal, IRONWOOD [MICH.] DAILY GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1962.
253
GILBERT Y. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE 102 (1966).
254
Memorandum from Herbert Rubinstein to Walter Devries, Exec. Assistant to Governor George Romney, Governor, Mich. 4 (Sept. 12, 1962) (on file with BHL, GR Papers,
Box 23). Throughout this Article, “BHL” refers to the Bentley Historical Library at the
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. “GR Papers” refers to the George Romney Papers, 1939–1973.
255
See id. at 1–8 (identifying issues in Michigan’s administration of public welfare);
Memorandum from Lynn Kellogg, Acting Dir., Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, Mich., to George
Romney, Governor 4 (Apr. 17, 1963) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 57) (explaining that locally administered “[d]irect relief” was “the backbone of the county social
welfare departmental structure,” and that if a new ADC-UP program “reduced direct relief
too greatly,” county-level welfare departments would become “economically unsound”).
250
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way to shift their relief costs to another level of government. By carefully choosing who was eligible, Romney believed, he could make all
localities see that the fiscal benefits outweighed traditional
concerns.256
Romney’s bill threaded the needle by defining “unemployed”
parent as a person who had been eligible to receive unemployment
benefits after January 1, 1958.257 This definition would qualify an estimated 10,000 families for AFDC-UP. More important, it excluded
some 20,000 other families, such as those in which the parent did not
work in an industry covered by the current unemployment program
(farm labor and domestic service, for example, were not covered) and
those who moved in and out of the workforce too frequently to qualify.258 These were the families, not coincidentally, that county welfare
authorities were most loath to give up. As Romney’s top welfare administrator explained, they were “the less educated, the less employable, [and] the less intelligent unemployed.”259 Such families were
“best . . . served” by a county-level direct relief program because the
county department could “establish certain controls” that would be
unavailable under a federally funded program like AFDC-UP.260
The bill moved easily through the state house of representatives
and appeared certain to pass the senate,261 but before Romney could
claim victory, the state welfare department received a disturbing call
from HEW: the plan’s eligibility restrictions were unreasonably narrow
and thus did not satisfy federal requirements.262 When Michigan officials ignored federal agency warnings,263 HEW Secretary Anthony
Celebrezze announced that the state legislature could enact the bill,
256

Memorandum from Lynn Kellogg to George Romney, supra note 255, at 4–5.
STEINER, supra note 253, at 105.
258
Id. at 101.
259
Memorandum from Lynn Kellogg to George Romney, supra note 255, at 4. Willard
Maxey died just before HEW took issue with the bill. STEINER, supra note 253, at 102.
260
Letter from Lynn Kellogg, Acting Dir., Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, Mich., to Frank
Kelley, Att’y Gen., Mich. (Apr. 5, 1963) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 57).
Such “controls” included, for example, the practice of giving relief in kind rather than in
cash.
261
STEINER, supra note 253, at 102–03.
262
Transcript of conversation between Phyllis Osborne, Reg’l Representative, Region
III, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, and Lynn Kellogg, Acting Dir., Dep’t of Soc.
Welfare, Mich., (Mar. 8, 1963) (on file with BHL, GR Papers, Box 23). Osborne, HEW’s
regional representative, characterized the decision as a politically motivated effort by
Wilbur Cohen, a native Michigander, to frustrate Romney. Id. HEW had raised no objection to similar plans in two other jurisdictions. STEINER, supra note 253, at 105–06.
263
See Letter from John J. Hurley, Acting Dir., Bureau of Pub. Assistance, Dep’t of
Health, Educ., and Welfare, to Lynn Kellogg, Acting Dir., Dep’t of Social Welfare, Mich.
(Apr. 17, 1963) (on file with NARA II, SRS Records, 363/1/4) (specifying ignored telegrams). Throughout this Article, “SRS Records” refers to the Records of the Social and
Rehabilitation Service (a division of HEW that was created in 1967 to house the various
HEW bureaus and offices in charge of welfare, aging, and vocational rehabilitation).
257
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but no federal funds would follow.264 Celebrezze left the explaining
to his veteran General Counsel, Alanson Willcox.
Willcox’s formal legal memorandum illustrates how administrators continued to transform what had been an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment into an interpretation of their governing statute, the Social Security Act. If a state’s eligibility criteria were narrower than what the Act permitted, Willcox explained, the agency
could approve federal funds only if the limiting classification was “a
rational one in the light of the purposes of public assistance programs.” The purpose of AFDC-UP was to aid a group of needy children that was ineligible for traditional AFDC, namely needy children
of “intact” families with an employable-but-unemployed breadwinner.
Yes, the new federal law allowed states to define “unemployed,” but
the general rule still applied: states had no authority to be “whimsical”
(or in this case, unfairly discriminatory) in their choices. “A man losing his employment with a nonprofit university or hospital is just as
much (or just as little) ‘unemployed’ as a person in like circumstance
losing his employment with a commercial establishment,” Willcox argued. Such “highly artificial” line-drawing was irrational and perhaps,
Willcox hinted, unconstitutional. Should the Michigan AFDC-UP bill
become law, he noted, an excluded applicant “could make a forceful
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.”265
Romney asked his own lawyer, Richard Van Dusen, to review the
Willcox memo and, not surprisingly, received a different interpretation. Willcox’s so-called rule was a “bald assertion” with no statutory
support, Van Dusen proclaimed. In fact, federal law obligated HEW to
approve the plan: Michigan’s bill fulfilled all the statutory requirements.266 With this opinion in his pocket, Romney signed the state’s
AFDC-UP bill into law. He would not “[a]cced[e] to unauthorized
federal dictation” in federal-state sharing programs, he announced.267
Over the following weeks, Romney received encouragement from
fellow governors,268 but much less support from his own state’s Attor264
Public Statement, Anthony Celebrezze, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare
(Mar. 26, 1963) (on file with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 7; notes on file with author).
Throughout this Article, “WHS” refers to the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison,
Wisc. “EW Papers” refers to the Elizabeth Wickenden Papers, 1885–2001.
265
Memorandum Concerning Authority of the Secretary under Title IV of the Social
Security Act, to Disapprove Michigan House Bill 145 on the Ground of its Limitations on
Eligibility, Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Mar. 25,
1963) (original on file with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 7; notes on file with author)
[hereinafter “Willcox memo”].
266
Memorandum from Richard C. Van Dusen to George W. Romney, Governor, Mich.
4 (Mar. 27, 1963) (on file with NARA II, SRS Records, 363/1/4).
267
Public Statement, George Romney, Governor, Mich. 1 (Mar. 27, 1963) (on file with
NARA II, SRS Records, 363/1/4).
268
Tani, supra note 78, at 286.
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ney General, Frank J. Kelley. Kelley, a political rival,269 proffered an
opinion that adopted and extended HEW’s legal reasoning:
Michigan’s AFDC-UP law denied the people the equal protection of
the law, in violation of both the U.S. and state constitutions.270 Administrative equal protection simply would not go away.
Ultimately, Michigan bowed to federal authority. Romney believed that his administration’s interpretation of federal law was correct, he explained at a July 21, 1963, meeting of the Governors’
Conference, but he was loath to spend resources on a court challenge
only to have the court refuse to hear the case. (Given the D.C. Circuit
ruling in Arizona v. Hobby,271 the possibility was real.) It was also probably not a good time for a “modern Republican” with presidential aspirations to affiliate himself so strongly with states’ rights, or to appear
dismissive of equality concerns: At that very moment, Americans were
watching a civil rights debacle unfold in Birmingham, Alabama, where
segregationist police chief Eugene “Bull” Connor was leading merciless attacks on peaceful protesters. All Romney could do was urge his
fellow governors to seek explicit congressional recognition of states’
right to judicial review of administrative decisions.272 In the
meantime, administrative equal protection continued to constrain
state action—even as the agency itself steadily backed away from the
business of constitutional interpretation.
D. Equal Protection as a Statutory Requirement:
The Birth of Condition X
By 1963, administrative equal protection had become woven into
agency culture. Consider, for example, this statement, from a HEW
administrator (not a lawyer) to a regional conference of the American
Public Welfare Association:
269
Romney and Kelley had sparred mere months before, during Michigan’s 1962 constitutional convention. Anticipating the Supreme Court’s holding in Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (holding that state senators must be elected on the basis of “one
person, one vote”), Kelley had urged delegates to tread cautiously as they considered legislative reapportionment; Convention Vice President Romney ignored his warnings. The apportionment feud continued into 1963. Decision May Affect State, IRONWOOD [MICH.] DAILY
GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1962, at 8; Governor, Attorney General Stand Ground on Their Fight, HOLLAND
[MICH.] EVENING SENTINEL, Apr. 11, 1963, at 17.
270
Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 4156 (Apr. 11, 1963) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2
Records, Box 57).
271
No. 2008-52 (D.D.C. dismissed Feb. 20, 1953).
272
George Romney, Governor, Mich., Presentation to Committee on Federal-State Relations at the Governors’ Conference 4–5 (July 21, 1963) (on file with BHL, GR Papers,
Box 228). States gained that right two years later, via an amendment to the Social Security
Act. See Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 8997, § 1116(a)(1), 79 Stat. 286, 400, 419 (1965) (prescribing a ninety-day limit for such
review).
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As the [AFDC] program goes through its periods of stress and strain
and as communities have sought to solve . . . problems . . . by quick
and easy solutions, such as new eligibility requirements, it has been
necessary for the Federal Government to examine these new proposals in relation to the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable classifications of persons in similar circumstances. The principle
of reasonable classification derives from basic constitutional protections and
thus, in a sense, represents a higher law than the specific provisions of
law.273

It is hard to imagine a clearer statement of administrative equal
protection.
And yet, as previous subparts show, top administrators had begun
to question how involved they ought to be in vindicating constitutional rights. Disaffected politicians were one problem—and not just
state executives. West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd went on an antiwelfare rampage in 1962 and 1963, via his chairmanship of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations for the District of Columbia.
Based on a sampling of the District’s welfare cases, Byrd concluded
that 75% of ADC recipients were technically ineligible for aid. In the
wake of this disclosure, the Senate Appropriations Committee ordered HEW to conduct a nation-wide review of the program.274
Public schools were another problem, as Arthur Flemming had
realized when considering how to discipline Louisiana. In the early
1960s, HEW administered not only the Social Security Act’s public assistance grants, but also grants to support education in areas affected
by federal governmental activities, such as defense installations.275 If
public school districts in these areas maintained racial segregation,
but technically complied with the conditions of grant-authorizing statutes, did HEW have the right—and if so, the responsibility—to withhold federal funds?
HEW Secretary Abraham Ribicoff asked General Counsel
Alanson Willcox that very question in the spring of 1962, as the Kennedy administration contemplated what to do about the South’s slow
response to Brown.276 (This was before the enactment of Title VI of
273
Jules H. Berman, Chief, Div. of Welfare Servs., Welfare Admin., Dep’t of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, The Federal Responsibility for Public Welfare, paper presented to the
Central States Regional Conference, American Public Welfare Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 4 (May 2, 1963) (personal collection of Frances White, on file with author) (emphasis added).
274
The Sleepy Welfare Watchdogs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1962, at 16.
275
See Impact Aid Program, Pub. L. No. 81-815, 64 Stat. 967 (1950); Pub. L. No. 81874, 64 Stat. 1100 (1950) (repealed and eventually reauthorized and codified as part of
Title VIII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7701).
276
Memorandum from Alanson W. Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare, to the Sec’y, Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare (Apr. 25, 1962) (personal
collection of Frances White, on file with author). Congress had also expressed interest in
the issue. Only two months prior, the House Committee on Labor and Education had
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which would provide firmer guidance.277)
Willcox—who had championed administrative equal protection
throughout his career—returned a cautious response. He was “quite
prepared to assume,” he wrote to Ribicoff, that such school districts
were violating the Fourteenth Amendment, irrespective of whether
they were under court orders to desegregate, but HEW’s role in policing such violations was questionable. In his view, administrative officers were not free “to project” the Supreme Court’s school
segregation decisions “into areas where [their] applicability is open to
serious legal doubt,” especially when it meant contravening a statutory
mandate. “Federal financial aid of course does strengthen schools
that discriminate,” Willcox noted, but this “powerful argument” was
not HEW’s to consider; it ought to be addressed to Congress or the
courts.278
If this were true, however, what legal principle authorized the
agency to take the stances that it had so visibly taken with Arizona and
Louisiana? What principle allowed Willcox himself, less than a year
after giving this advice to Ribicoff, to oppose Michigan’s AFDC-UP
plan? In the fall of 1963, HEW’s Office of General Counsel tasked
summoned Ribicoff before it to testify about integration in public education programs.
There, Ribicoff had been grilled about his agency’s basis for continuing to issue federal
funds to segregated school districts. HALPERN, supra note 171, at 27.
277
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, Pub. L. No. 88-352 78 Stat. 241 (prohibiting
discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin from all programs and
activities receiving federal financial assistance; authorizing federal agencies that extend
such assistance to effectuate the Title’s commands, subject to oversight by Congress, the
president, and the federal judiciary).
278
Willcox to Ribicoff, supra note 276, at 2–3, 5. Around this time, the DOJ did try to
bring this argument before the courts, by seeking to enjoin certain public schools from
racially segregating the children of U.S. military personnel and other federal government
employees. See, e.g., United States v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 220 F. Supp. 243, 244 (W.D.
La. 1963) (invoking contractual and statutory authority to sue a local school district). DOJ
lawyers advanced a “contractual obligation” theory, arguing that when local schools used
federal grant monies for construction of their facilities, they had to comply with Brown’s
desegregation mandate. Id. at 244–45. The strategy produced underwhelming results.
Compare Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 220 F. Supp. at 248 (finding no standing and no claim upon
which relief can be granted), and United States v. Biloxi Mun. Sch. Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691,
694 (S.D. Miss. 1963) (finding no claim or standing), and United States v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of
Prince George Cnty., Va., 221 F. Supp. 93, 105 (E.D. Va. 1963) (finding no claim or standing), with United States v. Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 60, 61 (N.D. Ala. 1963)
(finding for the government on the merits). For its part, HEW took a more modest course:
beginning in September 1963, Secretary Ribicoff ruled, segregated schools would not be
considered “suitable” for children residing on federal property (i.e., military bases); if a
district with segregated schools chose not to desegregate, the Commissioner of Education
was authorized to create alternative, integrated schools on base; the district would then
lose the federal funds that would have gone towards educating the on-base children (while
retaining funds for other federally connected children who continued to attend). U.S.
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS ‘63, 200 (1963). HEW took an even more
conservative approach with regards to medical facilities that received federal aid, since the
statute that authorized funds—the Hill–Burton Act—specifically permitted ‘separate but
equal’ facilities. Javits Assails Segregated Hospital Aid, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1963, at A2.
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new recruit Frances White, fresh out of Yale Law School, with answering this question.
After spending weeks sifting through agency records, White concluded that “Federal administrators ha[d] always required State plans
to satisfy a condition which is not explicitly contained in the statute.”
Sometimes they called that condition “reasonable classification”;
sometimes “equal protection,” “equity,” or “uniformity.” Sometimes
they referred to it as “condition 2(a)(x),” an unwritten but implicit
addendum to the requirements in “sections 2(a)(1), 2(a)(2), 2(a)(3),
etc.” of the various public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.
But administrators had never defined “the exact scope of such a condition,” nor had they explained their enforcement choices.279
Surveying agency actions from the 1940s and 1950s, White found
clear evidence that administrators believed they were giving life to the
Constitution’s equal protection mandate. Were the agency to take
that stance in late 1963, however, it would lead to an “inevitable”—
and unpalatable—conclusion: “[T]hat all State programs which were
receiving Federal aid could be forced to satisfy the requirements of
the equal protection clause.” If this were true, and if paired with the
Supreme Court’s recent interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal administrators would have to ensure “that the Constitution followed every Federal dollar to its ultimate destination” and that
the civil rights of every beneficiary were protected. The agency could
not afford “such epidemic theories.”280 If defunding a state welfare
program was the “nuclear option” in agency parlance, White later recalled, then defunding a state on equal protection grounds was “a hydrogen bomb,” capable of leveling the whole landscape of federally
subsidized social welfare programs. “[O]ur weapon,” she explained,
had become “too big.”281
White urged her colleagues to consider how the Social Security
Act, rather than the Constitution, could support the agency’s goals.
The touchstone, they could argue, was the Act’s fundamental purpose—which, in the case of the AFDC Title, was to support a specific
class of needy children. White extracted this purpose from the Title’s
definition of “dependent child,” namely, “a [needy] child under the
age of eighteen who has been deprived of parental support or
care . . . and who is living with [a list of specified relatives].” In reviewing state plans that adopted a narrower classification, White continued, the agency could properly insist on “reasonableness in the light
of the general purpose of the statute”—and the results would be
279

White, supra note 189, at 1, 15.
Id. at 9–12.
281
Karen M. Tani, Notes from Conversation with Frances White (May 25, 2014) (on
file with author).
280
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“quite similar to those obtained from the equal protection
rationale.”282
Meanwhile, the statutory approach would allow the agency to
avoid the segregation landmine. If eligible individuals received the
material assistance to which they were entitled under the law, “can
one object to the ‘separate but equal’ room which a person must sit in
when he comes to fill out an application blank?” Such a system would
surely violate equal protection, White answered, but under the preceding logic, the federal administrator had a principled basis for remaining silent.283 (This, again, was before the enactment of Title VI,
which would explicitly authorize HEW to object in such a case.)284
As for the effect on the other programs HEW administered, the
statutory-based approach to equal protection also had an advantage:
unlike the Constitution-based approach, it was not “readily transferable” to other programs, even other programs authorized under the
Social Security Act.285 In short, it was a more precise and limited tool.
Going forward, agency lawyers would follow White’s suggestion. (Actors outside the agency, we will see, did not feel so constrained.)
There was only one notable dissenter: A. D. Smith (retired by
then and living in Western Massachusetts). “[O]ne does not forbid
the exclusion of negroes and Indians because of its non-conformity
with program objectives,” Smith scolded Willcox, after Willcox sent
him a copy of White’s 1963 memo. “One does so . . . because it shocks
the conscience and so violates the Constitutional mandate” of equal
protection. Were it otherwise, Smith explained, Judge Schweinhaut
and perhaps even the Social Security Board “would have failed to act
affirmatively on the Indian issue.” In general, Smith saw nothing
wrong with a federal administrator drawing upon constitutional principles when “occasion demands”—that was the administrator’s prerogative (just as it was Congress’s). The contemporary political context
was irrelevant. Why should “the awakened conscience of the people
on the matter of Civil Rights . . . deter administrative reliance on due
process and equal protection”? he demanded.286
282
White, supra note 189, at 14–16 (quoting Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-721,
§ 406(a), 49 Stat. 620, 629 (1935)).
283
Id. Regarding whether such a system would violate equal protection, White likely
had in mind both Brown v. Board of Education and an important 1963 decision from the
Fourth Circuit, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959, 961 (1963) (holding that a private hospital that accepted federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act was a state
actor for purposes of a Fifth Amendment equal protection challenge to its segregated
facilities).
284
See supra note 170.
285
White, supra note 189, at 15–16.
286
Letter from A. D. Smith to Alanson Willcox, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare (Nov. 1, 1963) (personal collection of Frances White, on file with author).
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Whether Willcox wrote back, we do not know, but the agency’s
subsequent actions suggest that Smith represented the way of the past,
and Frances White, the way of the future. Going forward, explicit references to equal protection would all but disappear from agency correspondence with the states.
IV
ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE LEGAL
CAMPAIGN FOR WELFARE RIGHTS, 1964–1970
For people outside the agency, such as the supremely well-connected public welfare advocate Elizabeth Wickenden, administrative
equal protection was neither tired nor dangerous—precisely the opposite. It felt like a fresh, new approach to a broken welfare system.
In 1959, she had complained to her old friend Wilbur Cohen of feeling “exasperat[ed]”— frustrated by her inability to influence actual
policy.287 In 1962, by contrast, she was fully energized. Because of her
role in the Louisiana controversy, she had started receiving correspondence from around the nation about rights violations in welfare administration. She even received letters from HEW administrators,
such as Chief of Welfare Services Jules Berman. He told her about
state administrators’ “sudden midnight and Sunday visits” to ADC recipients’ homes (in search of male companions), about “tailing recipients, and even making women take pregnancy tests.” Berman feared
that such methods infringed on individual rights, but as his letter to
Wickenden implies, he felt unable to address the issue from his own
institutional location.288
By 1963, drawing on the legal knowledge she had gained from
agency contacts, Wickenden began pondering the use of “test cases”
to help well-meaning federal administrators. As she explained to
close friend Abe Fortas (two days after his oral argument before the
Supreme Court in the landmark case Gideon v. Wainright 289), state and
local officials still tried to hold the poor to a “different standard of
behavior, law enforcement, civil right etc.”290 Without “judicial
backing,” she believed, federal administrators were going to find it
harder and harder to keep this illegal behavior in check.291
Wickenden expanded on this idea and developed possible constitutional arguments in a longer memo, titled “Poverty and the Law:
287
Letter from Elizabeth Wickenden to Wilbur Cohen (July 15, 1959) (original on file
with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 12; notes on file with author).
288
Letter from Jules Berman to Elizabeth Wickenden (Oct. 9, 1962) (original on file
with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 1; notes on file with author).
289
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
290
Letter from Elizabeth Wickenden to Abe Fortas (Jan. 17, 1963) (original on file
with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 16; notes on file with author).
291
Id.
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The Constitutional Rights of Assistance Recipients,” which she circulated to her vast network of civil rights and public welfare allies in late
March (right before the Michigan controversy exploded).292 Drawing
on the reams of correspondence she had received in the last year, as
well as on research by public welfare colleagues, Wickenden described
how state and local governments over-policed and punished the poor:
officials subjected them to deportation, charged them with rarely enforced fornication and adultery laws, searched their homes in the middle of the night, and threatened to take away their children—solely
because they sought public aid. Reformers had of course long railed
against the abuse of the poor; what Wickenden added was “the possibilities for legal remedies”—constitutional remedies. They “do exist,”
she insisted, and lawyers must begin asserting them.293
Looking back from a post-“rights revolution” perspective, the importance of Wickenden’s intervention may be difficult to appreciate.
But imagine the world as it looked in the early 1960s: the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act had by then received close study
from the federal agency and its state-level counterparts, but few others
had expressed interest. Individual litigants occasionally called on
state courts (and very occasionally, federal ones) to interpret the law,
but their lack of access to legal representation meant that these actions were few and far between. As for lawyers and legal academics,
most did not study the law of public assistance. Established doctrine
suggested that public assistance was in the nature of a gift or gratuity,
which implied that there was little to discuss: the government gave
and took at its pleasure. Wickenden’s “Poverty and the Law” helped a
broader community of legal liberals catch up to where people like A.
D. Smith had been since the New Deal.294

292
Elizabeth Wickenden, Poverty and the Law: The Constitutional Rights of Assistance
Recipients (Mar. 25, 1963) (on file with SWHA, NSWA2 Records, Box 52). Wickenden
closely followed the Michigan controversy and actively rallied support for HEW. In a
widely circulated memo, to which she attached the Willcox opinion, Wickenden compared
Michigan’s actions to Louisiana’s and reminded readers that the federal government paid
the vast majority of state public assistance costs. In light of this, and of the equitable treatment guarantees in the SSA and the Constitution, did the federal agency really lack the
power to say no to “arbitrary and discriminatory” treatment? Elizabeth Wickenden, The
Issues in the Michigan Welfare Controversy Relating to Extension of AFDC to Children of
the Unemployed (Mar. 28, 1963) (original on file with WHS, EW Papers, Mss 800, Box 7;
notes on file with author). Wickenden sent this memo to the Senate Finance Committee,
the House Ways and Means Committee, Senator McNamara, Senator Hart, the National
Urban League, all state welfare commissioners, all regional HEW officers, and many of her
public welfare friends and acquaintances.
293
Wickenden, supra note 292, at 7.
294
Smith tried to do this himself in his retirement, but his scholarship never caught on
beyond the social work and public welfare communities. See A. DELAFIELD SMITH, THE
RIGHT TO LIFE 77–121(1955).
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Over the course of the next decade, Wickenden saw her vision
become a reality. Her friend Charles Reich and other law professors
elaborated on existing constitutional arguments and created new
ones295 (e.g., Reich’s celebrated idea of a constitutionally protected
property interest in welfare payments296); a grassroots welfare rights
movement sprouted in cities around the nation, lending a sense of
urgency to law reform projects;297 and the Johnson Administration added legal services to its ambitious War on Poverty, allowing an emergent cohort of poverty lawyers to bring welfare rights claims before
the courts.298
Many notable Supreme Court cases resulted, including, Shapiro v.
Thomson, in which the Court struck down state laws that unduly restricted new residents from receiving AFDC,299 and Goldberg v. Kelly, in
which a majority of the Court appeared to recognize welfare as a form
of “property” and required agencies to provide a full evidentiary hearing before terminating a recipient’s benefits.300 All of these cases owe
something to administrative equal protection. By bringing the
Constitution into their work over a period of three decades, federal
administrators helped Americans begin to think about welfare recipients as constitutional subjects—people who fell under the document’s
protection. In a country where the poor have often been treated as
noncitizens, or subjects of exclusive local concern,301 that reconceptualization mattered.
295
Evidence suggests that Wickenden’s memo circulated widely among legal scholars,
including Caleb Foote (University of Pennsylvania), Ralph Fuchs (Indiana University), and
Jacobus tenBroek (University of California, Berkeley). See Tani, supra note 78, at 290–91.
296
See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778–83 (1964); see also
Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347,
1347–55 (1963) (discussing whether searches of welfare recipients’ homes without warrants violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
297
See generally FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007) (chronicling the rise of the modern welfare rights movement, with a focus on New York City); ANNELISE ORLECK, STORMING CAESARS PALACE: HOW
BLACK MOTHERS FOUGHT THEIR OWN WAR ON POVERTY (2005) (describing welfare rights
activism in Las Vegas, Nevada, from the 1960s through the 1980s).
298
See generally DAVIS, supra note 172 (providing an historical account of the legal arm
of the modern welfare rights movement); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990) (providing an empirical study of the relationship between the Legal Services Program and Supreme Court
decisionmaking between the late 1960s and early 1970s).
299
394 U.S. 618, 627–32 (1969). Shapiro also invalidated a residence restriction from
the District of Columbia. Id. at 642–43.
300
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
301
See generally CHAD ALAN GOLDBERG, CITIZENS AND PAUPERS: RELIEF, RIGHTS, AND
RACE, FROM THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU TO WORKFARE (2008) (using case studies to support T.
H. Marshall’s insight that traditional poor relief “treated the claims of the poor, not as an
integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them – as claims which
could be met ‘only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word’”)
(quoting T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in THE WELFARE STATE READER 30, 33
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The Supreme Court case with the most direct connection to administrative equal protection, however, is King v. Smith302—a case that
reached the Court at a moment when it seemed entirely possible that
a majority of the Justices would find in the Fourteenth Amendment
robust protections for the poor.303 The case began in the fall of 1966,
when the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security notified Mrs.
Sylvester Smith that she would no longer be receiving AFDC. The
problem, Smith’s caseworker told her, was that she appeared to have a
boyfriend, who occasionally visited on the weekends. Under
Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation (known colloquially as a
“man-in-the-house” rule), the agency could presume that the man
supported Smith’s children and terminate the household’s benefits.
Smith objected, both because the money mattered (although a mere
$29 a month, the payment constituted over a quarter of her household income) and because she felt she was being punished for private,
irrelevant behavior. Smith told her story to civil rights workers in the
Selma area, who in turn relayed it to the new Center on Social Welfare
Policy at Columbia University.304
The Center, led by lawyer Edward V. Sparer, was just beginning
an impact litigation campaign, with the goal of turning welfare into a
constitutional right. (Sparer had corresponded with Wickenden
about this, but he also had read and admired the work of A. D.
Smith.)305 Sylvester Smith was an ideal plaintiff. First, her story suggested racial discrimination, and racial discrimination claims had traction in federal court, especially in the South.306 Between 1964 and
1966, Alabama’s substitute father regulation had resulted in the removal of 15,000 children from the rolls and the rejection of another
6,400 applications; black Americans like Smith comprised an estimated 97% of these cases.307 A case from Alabama was also ideal because HEW had long objected to the state’s substitute father

(Christopher Pierson & Francis G. Castles eds., 1949)); FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A.
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 166 (Vintage Books
2d ed., 1993) (noting that as late as 1934, fourteen U.S. states deprived recipients of the
right to vote or hold office).
302
392 U.S. 309 (1968).
303
See, e.g., Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 435, 434–36 (1967) (discussing pre-King Supreme Court decisions that were concerned “that the poor not be denied access to certain privileges available to those who can
pay”).
304
Walter Goodman, The Case of Mrs. Sylvester Smith: A Victory for 400,000 Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1968, at SM28.
305
DAVIS, supra note 172, at 35–37.
306
See id. (describing the Center’s “Southern strategy” for selecting its earliest cases).
307
Goodman, supra note 304, at 62.
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regulation and had yet to formally approve it.308 The case eventually
became a class action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Through the
Center’s legal team, Smith alleged that Alabama’s substitute father
regulation was inconsistent with both the Social Security Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment (because it arbitrarily and irrationally classified certain needy dependent children as ineligible for aid).309
A three-judge panel of the district court 310 agreed, issuing a decision that embraced the plaintiff’s equal protection argument.
“[N]either the United States nor the Alabama Constitution requires
Alabama to grant financial assistance to needy dependent children,”
the Court explained, but once Alabama undertook to do so, it had to
conform its actions to “the constitutional mandate of equal protection.”311 That mandate demanded classifications that were “rationally
related to the purpose of the federal and [state] Aid to Dependent
Children statutes,” the Court continued, and Alabama’s classification
was not. Indeed, it was “precisely the type of classification” that the
Constitution prohibited: it aimed at discouraging the immoral conduct of mothers rather than meeting the needs of children.312
At this point, Alabama might have cut its losses. With just a slight
change to its regulation, it could achieve the same purpose and poor
claimants would be forced to litigate from scratch.313 But Alabama
officials had faith in the Supreme Court: given northern states’ reliance on moralistic welfare restrictions, they reasoned, the Court
would not dare affirm the decision.314 Alabama officials also might
have taken heart from HEW’s refusal to weigh in: in the face of a
district court directive to speak up, HEW had remained “coy.”315
HEW officials had also failed to respond to a petition from the Poor
People’s March on Washington, urging the agency to prohibit
man-in-the-house rules immediately (i.e., without waiting for a pro308
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 326 n.23 (1968) (chronicling the battle between
Alabama and federal authorities over the state’s suitable home and substitute father policies from 1959 to 1962); Goodman, supra note 304, at 67.
309
Brief for Appellees at 9, 34, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 0949), 1968
WL 112516, at *9.
310
See 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1948) (requiring a three-judge court to hear any case seeking
an injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress
on grounds of unconstitutionality), Repealed Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, sec.
2, 90 Stat. 1119.
311
Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 40 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
312
Id. at 39–40.
313
See MARTIN GARBUS, READY FOR THE DEFENSE 170 (1971) (noting that poor claimants
would have to start from square one if state legislators enacted a superseding statute).
Georgia officials followed this course in Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Ga.
1968) (invalidating the state’s “employable mother” rule on equal protection grounds).
314
GARBUS, supra note 313, at 171.
315
Id.
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nouncement from the Court).316 “[T]hese are not the best of times
for domestic welfare,” one journalist explained, “or for upsetting
Southern legislators.”317
Alabama officials miscalculated. After hearing the case, Justice
William O. Douglas was prepared to embrace the lower court’s equal
protection analysis. Under Alabama’s regulation, he explained,
“[t]he economic need of the children . . . their other means of support, are all irrelevant. The standard is the so-called immorality of the
mother.” In Justice Douglas’s view, this conflicted with the Court’s
recent decision in Levy v. Louisiana, in which the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause barred discrimination against illegitimate
children.318 He believed that “precisely the same result” should follow
here.319
The rest of the Court agreed to invalidate the regulation, but relied on a seemingly creative interpretation of the Social Security Act
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Political scientist R. Shep
Melnick has placed great emphasis on this statutory interpretation,
citing it as the epitome of a new, more aggressive mode of judicial
oversight.320 Melnick offers less insight into the origins of that interpretation: “the extraordinary story presented in King v. Smith” must
have simply “shocked the conscience of the Justices and induced them
to search for a novel interpretation of the statute,” he surmises.321
In fact, the Court did not have to look far: the interpretation the
majority used was the very one that HEW lawyer Frances White had
suggested in 1963.322 White’s memo itself does not appear in the
available Justices’ papers, but White’s interpretation was no secret by
the mid-1960s. Federal administrators continued to share information with outside activists, such as Elizabeth Wickenden and her vast
network. White’s memo also made its way to Yale Law School, where
former HEW General Counsel Jack Tate was then Dean. The White
memo formed the basis of a published student note, titled Welfare’s
“Condition X,”323 which specifically discussed the doctrine’s application
316
317
318
319
320

Barrett, supra note 80, at 21.
Goodman, supra note 304, at 67.
391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1967).
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 336 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 84–86

R
R

(1994).
321

Id. at 108.
See WHITE, supra note 189, at 9–13.
323
Note, Welfare’s “Condition X,” 76 YALE L.J. 1222, 1230–31 (1967). Other student
notes that suggest a HEW-Yale pipeline in the Tate era include, Note, “Suitable Home” Tests
Under Social Security: A Functional Approach to Equal Protection, 70 YALE L.J. 1192 (1961); Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1967); and Comment, Withdrawal of Public Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YALE L.J. 1234 (1967).
322
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to substitute father policies. Smith’s lawyer cited this note in his brief
to the Supreme Court.324
HEW’s interpretation of the Social Security Act—which I have argued was essentially a reframing of administrative equal protection—
seems to have made an impression on a majority of the Court. The
touchstones of the Social Security Act’s public assistance titles, Chief
Justice Earl Warren explained, were (1) need, and in the case of
AFDC, (2) a child’s lack of parental support. These characteristics
defined the population that Congress intended to support.325 Undeniably, states were free to add eligibility requirements and set their
own standards of need—control over these choices was built into the
original Act—but Alabama was not entitled to impose restrictions that
had nothing to do with need and everything to do with discouraging
immorality. (Perhaps it might have done so in 1936, Justice Warren
conceded, but the Act has since been amended in ways that evinced a
“rehabilitative,” rather than punitive, approach.)326 For similar reasons, Justice Warren rejected Alabama’s argument that when a man
cohabitated with a woman, the state could presume that her children
were not in need. Adopting Alabama’s position, Justice Warren explained, “would require us to assume that Congress, at the same time
that it intended to provide programs for the economic security and
protection of all children, also intended arbitrarily to leave one class
of destitute children entirely without meaningful protection.” The
Court could not adopt such an “unreasonable” interpretation of congressional intent.327
King was a remarkable precedent. HEW had long battled punitive, moralistic state welfare rules, often using its own interpretation of
the Equal Protection Clause, and had faced ever-greater resistance.
When the Court at last turned its gaze to federal welfare grants to
states, it steered away from the Fourteenth Amendment but otherwise

324
Brief for Appellees at 29, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949), 1968 WL
112516, at *9.
325
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 317–18 (1968).
326
Id. at 325–26.
327
Id. at 329–30. This second part of the decision—on Alabama’s absence-of-need
argument—is arguably a departure from the agency’s “Condition X” interpretation of the
Social Security Act. Ira C. Lupu, Welfare and Federalism: AFDC Eligibility Policies and the Scope
of State Discretion, 57 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (1977); see also Roger E. Kohn, AFDC Eligibility
Requirements Unrelated to Need: The Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1219, 1234
(1970) (“King indeed circumscribed the states’ power more than did Condition X as
loosely applied by the administrative agencies.”). But see id. (“But to the extent King indicates that the protection of dependent children is the statutory goal overshadowing all
others, the [agency’s] formulation . . . of Condition X is effectively the same as the King
rationale.”).
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lent judicial support to the agency’s actions.328 Plaintiffs responded
by streaming into federal court.329
It has been easy for scholars to lose sight of King’s impact, however, because the decision was quickly overshadowed by another
Supreme Court case, one that was a decisive defeat for the poor. The
plaintiffs in Dandridge v. Williams challenged the ceilings that some
states imposed on the amount of aid that a family could collect per
month, irrespective of the number of children in the family who met
the state standard of need.330 To poverty lawyers, these “family caps”
were a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause (younger children were treated less favorably than older children, children in large
families less favorably than children in smaller families). Federal administrators, however, in an intriguing blind spot, had never considered caps a violation of their “equal treatment principle.”331
Confronted squarely with an equal protection question, the Court rejected the notion that state-level welfare classifications merited anything more than rational basis review under the Fourteenth
Amendment.332 Just like that, the idea of equal protection for the
poor appeared to die.
But we should not be so quick to forget King, for through it, the
administrative formulation of equal protection lived on. Thanks to
this decision, state welfare operations, not HEW, were on the defensive—an incredible reversal. Although Dandridge vindicated states’
traditional control over benefit levels, King implied “that states’ restrictions on eligibility”—a much more important prerogative—“were
invalid unless explicitly authorized by Congress,” thereby shifting a
presumption that had been crucial to the enactment of the original
Social Security Act.333
328
Perhaps most significantly, the Court in King did not question the plaintiff welfare
recipients’ right to bring their disputes with state welfare agencies into federal court. Silence is significant because until 1961, section 1983 had “lain dormant”; King was the first
case in which the Court accepted a section 1983 case seeking to enforce the Social Security
Act. Mark Neal Aronson, Representing the Poor: Legal Advocacy and Welfare Reform During
Reagan’s Gubernatorial Years, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 994 (2013).
329
Between 1968 and 1975, the Supreme Court alone decided eighteen AFDC cases.
MELNICK, supra note 320, at 83.
330
397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970).
331
Federal administrators would have preferred to see all states provide more adequate payments to beneficiaries, but they recognized that under the Social Security Act,
states had control over benefit levels and standards of need. Federal administrators seem
to have understood family caps as a legitimate way of allocating scarce resources. See
MELNICK, supra note 320, at 67–82.
332
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (applying “reasonable basis” scrutiny); see also San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973) (rejecting the notion that
classifications based on wealth merited stricter scrutiny).
333
MELNICK, supra note 320, at 84–92; see also Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 346–48
(1975) (striking down New York “lodger” regulations as a violation of the Social Security
Act); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 600–04 (1972) (striking down a California re-
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V
ADMINISTRATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION

This Article ends where it began, with Alanson Willcox, now at
the end of his career. The spring of 1968 was not a pleasant time to
be part of the federal government. Civil rights activism continued to
spur violent resistance (Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated that
April, sparking riots around the country); the war effort in Vietnam
had taken a dramatic and demoralizing turn for the worse, energizing
the already strong antiwar and youth movements; and President
Johnson’s ambitious War on Poverty appeared to be foundering.334
The poor, some critics complained, were not responding with gratitude to the opportunities the government offered, but instead with
righteous anger and a disturbing sense of entitlement.335 They were
also responding with law, as Willcox knew only too well. Poverty lawyers—many funded by the War on Poverty’s Federal Legal Services
Program—were suing not only state officials, for violating their statutory and constitutional rights, but also federal officials, for not doing
more to crack down on the states. 336
In response to one such suit, Willcox wrote a memo in which the
very idea of administrative constitutionalism was abhorrent. “It is reasonably plain,” Willcox argued, “that the Secretary has no authority to
disapprove a State plan which complies with the stated Federal requirements, or to withhold funds from the State, merely because of
his judgment that some aspect of the State plan may be unconstitutional.” “Similarly,” the Secretary had no obligation “to resolve all of
the constitutional issues that may arise in the course of administering
a State plan.” The Secretary could not, of course, require a state to
striction on aid to children whose parents are away on military duty); Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282, 285–92 (1971) (striking down the state’s restrictions on children attending
college or university because of a lack of congressional intent).
334
On American politics in the late 1960s, see generally MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL
KAZIN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1960S 127–92 (4th ed.) (2011) (providing
an overview of the political, cultural, and social changes that rocked the nation during the
second half of the 1960s); JAMES T. PATTERSON, THE EVE OF DESTRUCTION: HOW 1965
CHANGED AMERICA (2014) (documenting the events of 1965 as a way of foreshadowing the
broad and dramatic changes that unfolded over the next half-dozen years). On the particular events of 1968, see generally JEREMI SURI, POWER AND PROTEST: GLOBAL REVOLUTION
AND THE RISE OF DETENTE (2005) (describing 1968 as a year of global social protest and
analyzing the factors that made it so). On the War on Poverty, see generally ANNELISE
ORLECK & LISA GAYLE HAZIRJIAN, THE WAR ON POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY (2010)
(providing an overview of the historical writing on the War on Poverty and collecting new
research).
335
See, e.g., Eve Edstrom, Shriver is Booed Out of Meeting, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1966, at
A1 (describing the critical reception that the Citizen’s Crusade Against Poverty gave to War
on Poverty spokesperson Sargent Shriver); John P. MacKenzie, Poor’s Militancy Poses Challenge to Liberals, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1966, at A2 (describing “[u]gly responses from the
poor and some of their spokesmen” to the Johnson Administration’s poverty programs).
336
DAVIS, supra note 172, at 34–49.
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violate the Constitution, but “he is under no duty to test all of the
particulars of State administration against his own concepts of constitutional law.”337
This Article has recovered a history that Willcox, in 1968, evaded.
From the earliest days of the Social Security Act, I have argued, the
administrators charged with overseeing federal grants labored in the
shadow of the Fourteenth Amendment. In subsequent decades, when
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence offered little to
poor Americans, federal administrators developed and applied a
nondeferential rationality model of equal protection to assess state
welfare rules. And although they certainly could have done more to
vindicate the rights of the poor, their interpretation had tangible consequences. Administrators challenged some of the era’s most discriminatory and moralistic state welfare laws and, in the process, spread
the notion that poor Americans fell within the Constitution’s protections—that they were constitutional “persons” rather than “nonpersons,” to borrow Justice Abe Fortas’s 1967 turn of phrase.338
Administrators subsequently changed tactics, recharacterizing
their constitutional interpretation as a statutory one, lest their actions
vis-à-vis state welfare programs come back to haunt them in the realms
of education and health. (What might have happened, we might wonder, had President Roosevelt not bundled these functions together in
1939?)339 But by the early 1960s, federal administrators’ ideas had
spread to a growing network of liberal activists and advocates. These
outsiders used the agency’s carefully cultivated constitutional arguments to demand that federal courts review the worst practices within
the federal-state welfare system. The 1968 Supreme Court case King v.
Smith is a legacy of administrative equal protection: although not decided on equal protection grounds,340 the Court’s decision vindicated
the agency’s understanding of the equal protection principle. The case
became much less useful, of course, when Congress reframed the purposes of the AFDC program, shifting the focus from need to work and
explicitly allowing states to impose behavioral conditions on recipients, but that took nearly thirty years.341
Having summarized administrative equal protection’s remarkable
thirty-some year trajectory, this Article turns now to the question of
337
Alanson Willcox, AWW Draft March 11, 1968, at 3–4 (Mar. 11, 1968), (personal
collection of Frances White, on file with author).
338
Abe Fortas, Equal Protection for Whom?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 5, 1967, at 4.
339
Cf. Lee, supra note 13, at 801–02, 810–56 (showing how, at the same historical
moment, different agencies may interpret the same constitutional provisions differently).
340
Supporters of welfare rights ultimately seem to have approved this choice. See
GARBUS, supra note 313, at 194.
341
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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significance. Why should we care? The payoff for historians is perhaps easiest to see, especially for those who also study the “age of statutes”: this Article responds to Reuel Schiller’s call for “a legal history
of the postwar period that includes the interaction of courts and agencies”342 and to Jeffrey Jenkins and Eric Patashnik’s demand for research on “how public laws are born, how they live, how they remake
or fail to remake politics, and how they mutate and die.”343 In keeping with trends in the “new civil rights history,” this Article helps us
understand the path of the law—and the paths foregone—by analyzing the complex interaction of ideas, institutions, legal doctrines, and
people (lay and professional) across “space, class, race, and time.”344
And joining a crop of recent historical scholarship on the “modern
American state,” this Article helps us make that abstract notion concrete, by describing and analyzing its practices—that is, “what officials
do” as they go about the messy business of governance.345
The relevance of this history to legal scholars may be less obvious,
which is why I devote the remainder of this Part to possible “lessons”
for three major areas of law: federalism, administrative law, and constitutional law.346
Federalism. This Article’s implications for our understanding of
American federalism are at least two-fold. First, the history recounted
here is the clear backdrop for the emergence, starting in the
mid-1970s, of a “new judicial federalism”347—one that upheld broad
342
Reuel E. Schiller, The Administrative State, Front and Center: Studying Law and Administration in Postwar America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 415, 418 (2008).
343
Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Eric M. Patashnik, Living Legislation and American Politics, in
LIVING LEGISLATION: DURABILITY, CHANGE, AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN LAWMAKING 6
(2012).
344
Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2312,
2319, 2326–27 (2013).
345
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 5 & n.11 (2009); see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929
(2013) (exploring the crucial role of the federal income tax in the development of the
modern American state); STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010) (locating the origins of some aspects of the
modern American state in the management of Indian Affairs in the nineteenth century);
JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT (2011) (connecting the expansion of government power during World War II, and
the selling of that expansion to the public, to the literature on the modern American
state).
346
Others could be added, most notably social welfare or “poverty” law. I am wary,
however, of singling out the “law of the poor” as a discrete legal field, capable of being
cabined in its own casebooks, courses, and articles. This Article’s “lesson” for poverty law is
that the legal regulation (and resistance) of the poor ought to be at the center, not the
margins, of legal scholarship.
347
See generally Louise Weinberg, New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV 1191, 1192–94
(1977) (charting the emergence in the Supreme Court of a new approach to federalism,
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uses of Congress’s spending power (as in South Dakota v. Dole)348 but
placed careful limits on courts’ and agencies’ ability to augment the
“strings” attached to grants-in-aid. As Justice Warren hinted in King,
the Congress that enacted the Social Security Act in 1935 probably
would not have agreed with the Court’s 1968 interpretation of its
handiwork. With progressive era mothers’ pensions as their point of
reference, the drafters of the original Act were familiar with moralistic
state-level eligibility restrictions and did not object to them.349 Historians also agree that the Act’s drafters meant to give states vast discretion over who benefited from their programs. This Article shows
how the ground shifted over the following decades. After states applied for federal grants—after they and their citizens became dependent on federal funds—the rules changed. They changed not via
democratically elected legislative representatives, but, arguably, via administrative fiat (ratified belatedly by the judiciary).350
Perhaps the “graying” of the original Act called for such treatment. But either way, it provided fodder for critics of the New Deal
order, and lent urgency to conservative calls for a new “new federalism.” Take, for example, Arizona senator and presidential hopeful
Barry Goldwater, the father of the New Right: in his 1960 manifesto
The Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater characterized federal
grants-in-aid as “a mixture of blackmail and bribery.” “The States are
told to go along with the program ‘or else,’ ” he alleged.351
Richard Nixon echoed Goldwater’s concerns, and as president,
immediately began constructing what would become the Rehnquist
Court—famous for its attentiveness to the role of states in the federal
system. In 1981, with three of Nixon’s appointees in the majority
(Justices Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, and William Rehnquist) and a
fourth concurring (Justice Harry Blackmun), the Supreme Court signaled the end of decisions like King v. Smith, even as it purported to
affirm King’s holding: “[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract,” the majority explained
in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman: “in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”352 But by extension, the decision continued, the federal
“requiring deferences to state administration and state adjudication that only yesterday
were thought unnecessary or unwise”).
348
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
349
See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE, 1890–1935, at 280–82 (1998).
350
I say “arguably” because, although precise conversations are difficult to reconstruct,
federal administrators were always aware of Congress; they could not afford to ignore the
messages they received in committee hearings and behind closed doors. See Barrett, supra
note 80, at 5.
351
BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE 19 (1960).
352
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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government may not hold a state to conditions of which it was “unaware” at the time the bargain was struck.353 The upshot was a judicially imposed “clear statement rule”: “if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys,” the Court held, “it must do
so unambiguously.”354
Nixon also began repackaging New Deal and Great Society
matching grants as block grants, a task that successive conservative
(and neoliberal) politicians would continue.355 Proponents associated this policy change with efficiency, rationality, and democratic accountability; critics saw an attempt to undermine a half-century of
liberal reform and restore to state and local governments the ability to
control marginal populations. This Article reminds scholars of the
context: policymakers were reacting to the ways in which cooperative
federalism played out in the decades after the New Deal. In the welfare context, as in the contexts of education and health, federal aid
proved to be both a precious resource and a Trojan horse. Grants
brought a level of federal administrative intrusion that some state officials had not bargained for and that they had difficulty addressing via
conventional channels. (Judicial review of agency decisions eluded
them—the lesson of Arizona v. Hobby—and their representatives in
Congress had a limited ability to see what federal administrators were
doing on a day-to-day basis.) Block grants, much like the judicial federalism described above, did not stop the flow of federal funds to
states, but they limited the power of federal administrators to change
the rules unilaterally.356
353
Id.; see also Bennett v. Kentucky, 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985) (explaining that a state
grantee’s legal liability turns on the “statutory provisions, regulations, and other guidelines” that were “in place when the grants were made”).
354
451 U.S. at 17. On Pennhurst as a decision signaling “intense devotion to protecting
state sovereignty interests,” see William N. Eskridge Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45. VAND. L. REV 593, 642
(1992). Pennhurst’s clear statement rule is now even more solicitous to states, thanks to the
Court’s explication of it in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548
U.S. 291 (2006). See Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 443 (2008) (explaining
that in Arlington, the Supreme Court chose “to articulate a new, narrower standard with
which to review federal conditions placed on state acceptance of federal funds”).
355
See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A
Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 297–99 (1996) (documenting and explaining the enthusiasm for block grants from the 1970s through the
mid-1990s).
356
There remains one doctrinal wrinkle: the deference that the Supreme Court has
said is owed to agencies’ statutory interpretations under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). On the tension between Pennhurst and Chevron,
see David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197,
1203–08 (2004); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J.
1187, 1188–92 (2001).
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The Article’s second contribution to the federalism field is the
fresh insight it gives into today’s “uncooperative federalism.” At first
glance, Barry Goldwater’s critique of grants-in-aid appears to have a
modern analogue in some states’ objections to the Affordable Care
Act’s expanded Medicaid grants, at issue in the recent Supreme Court
decision National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.357 Ideologically, there is doubtless some continuity. But it is not 1960 anymore: today’s cooperative federalism empowers states, albeit from
within federal statutory law358 (including, Abbe Gluck argues, the Affordable Care Act.359) States today not only coadminister major regulatory programs, offering ample opportunity for negotiation and
dissent, but they also claim ownership over statutory drafting and interpretation. Acting as groups, state officials leverage their power and
expertise to influence the shape of new statutory schemes.360 After
the enactment of legislation, Congress’s increasing use of the waiver
process allows them to “rewrit[e] substantial portions of statutory
schemes.”361 And when they disagree with federal administrators
about statutory implementation, they may force the federal agency to
explain itself before the public.362 Influence continues through consultations between state and federal administrators, and more subtly,
through the “close bonds and loyalty” that develop between these actors.363 In short, state autonomy is a fiction, but through grant-in-aid
programs and other cooperative arrangements, state influence is real.
Pairing this Article’s historical findings with current realities, a
pressing future research question is the degree to which states,
through their coadministrative capacity, influence the meaning of the
Constitution. If agency decision making is, in fact, “a main mechanism by which constitutional meaning is elaborated and implemented
today,”364 then we must consider the possibility that state officials,
operating in what they understand to be their states’ interests, are

357

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 478–86 (2012); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 24, at 1284;
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at 585–87; Gluck,
Our [National] Federalism, supra note 60, at 2005–10; Metzger, supra note 55, at 2100–09;
Ernest A Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1380–96 (2001).
359
See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 60, at
584–93.
360
See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 115–67 (2009).
361
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 60, at 1934, 1939.
362
See id. at 1939.
363
Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, VAND. L. REV. 443, 469 (2014).
364
Metzger, supra note 13, at 1901.
358
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imbuing the Constitution with their priorities and commitments.365
For the Fourteenth Amendment, that would be an ironic outcome
indeed.
Administrative Law. In recent years, a growing subset of administrative law scholars have devoted deep and sustained study to what
agencies actually do, rather than focusing exclusively on what agencies
should do (or what courts think they should do); only with this foundation do they turn to the question of whether our current system of
administrative law doctrines and statutes is sound and desirable.366
This Article reminds scholars how much we have left to learn when it
comes to understanding agencies’ engagement with the Constitution,
and how much we stand to gain if we do this work. To suggest just a
handful of possible research questions: Which agencies are, or have
been, most likely to engage in administrative constitutionalism?
Which have been inclined to renounce it? Have agency
interpretations tended to be more or less conservative than judicial
365
Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 610–15
(2011) (arguing for the “central importance of administrative federalism” and calling for
more research on the extent to which administrative federalism protects state interests).
366
See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 16 (2012) (broadening the definition of administrative law to go beyond “‘judicial review of administrative action’”; using
a series of historical case studies to explore “the development and implementation of law
and policy by officials specifically charged with that responsibility”); Lisa Schultz Bressman
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of
Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 64–98 (2006) (using interviews with top administrators at the EPA in two presidential administrations to evaluate the “presidential control
model” of administrative decisionmaking); Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell,
The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (comparing “the
actual workings of the administrative state” with “the assumptions animating the APA and
classic judicial decisions that followed”); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 929–36 (2008)
(using twenty years’ of agency notice-and-comment rulemaking data to identify patterns
over time in how agencies have promulgated rules); Connor N. Raso, Agency Avoidance of
Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (detailing how and when
agencies avoid rulemaking procedures); Raso, supra note 69, at 792, 806, 820–21 (providing an empirical analysis of agencies’ issuance of guidance documents); Wendy Wagner,
Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1739–75 (2012) (using a set of EPA regulations to test empirically whether judicial review of agency rulemaking protects the public interest in the ways
that scholars have assumed); Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking
in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99,
104–20 (2011) (tracking imbalances in the “rulemaking life cycle” and explaining their
impact on the substance of rulemaking projects); Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (using original survey data to document and
explain how federal administrators interpret statutes); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume
and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445–63 (2012) (compiling empirical
data to rebut the conclusion that ossification is a widespread problem in rulemaking);
Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 999–1007 (2011) (using empirical data and
interviews to analyze whether and how agencies seek to avoid review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
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interpretations? What sources, experiences, and commitments have
administrators drawn upon as they crafted their interpretations? Have
agencies’ interpretive choices and strategies changed over time, as the
Supreme Court has issued clearer statements about the deference
owed to agency decisions? To the extent that we can discern meaningful patterns across agencies’ interpretations of the Constitution,
what accounts for them?367 The answers to these questions will necessarily affect how we model agency behavior, and, if we do not like what
we see, how we change it.
Such a research agenda may sound daunting, but this Article provides a template for how to begin. The most important takeaway is to
look outside of courts (as Jerry Mashaw has encouraged administrative
law scholars to do)368 and consider a broader range of sources: the
archives of agencies themselves, most obviously, but also the recollections and personal papers of key administrators, the correspondence
of groups and individuals who tried to influence them, and the
records of professional associations and schools whose members tend
to enter public administration. The world of administrative law is bigger and more complex than what can be seen from the bench, and its
impact on American life is larger still. We can and should map it.
Constitutional Law. Last but not least, this history has implications
for the study of constitutional law, and specifically for our understanding of the constitutional rights of the poor. Not so long ago, administrators in one of the nation’s most important federal agencies
believed that the Constitution required careful, skeptical review of
state welfare laws. In the course of their day-to-day work, they insisted
that the Equal Protection Clause was about much more than racial
discrimination; it also constrained states from using their power over
need-based public aid to impose different standards on the poor than
on everyone else.
367
Legal scholars have begun to answer similar questions regarding agencies’ statutory
interpretive choices, responding to Jerry Mashaw’s plea for more attention to this issue,
Jerry Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 498 (2005); see, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285–332
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (providing “an overview of
P[ositive] P[olitical] T[heory] research on agency statutory interpretation, and suggest[ing] some directions for future research); Walker, supra note 366 (manuscript at 4–8)
(exploring the roles of courts, legislative history, and canons in the way federal administrators interpret statutes). But work on constitutional interpretation remains scant. For a
tentative effort to account for how administrative constitutionalism has changed over time,
see Sophia Z. Lee, Federal Policy, Constitutional Rights, and Poverty in the Twentieth Century: “Administrative Constitutionalism” in New Contexts, Comment Delivered at the 2014
Policy History Conference (June 4, 2014) (on file with author) (dividing administrative
constitutionalism between the 1930s and into the 1980s into three periods).
368
See MASHAW, supra note 366, at 7.
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And yet that is not the Equal Protection Clause that most people
today imagine we have. Why? The history recounted above highlights
a fatal combination of factors: states’ heavy reliance on federal funds,
across multiple policy areas; some states’ determined resistance to civil
rights demands; the existence of a welfare population that had become popularly associated with blackness, immorality, and exploitation of public funds; and, in the face of all these concerns, a strategic
choice on the part of key administrators to withhold a well-developed
position on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment for the poor.
What followed was a series of Supreme Court decisions that continue to sit uneasily aside one another: King v. Smith, the sweeping
statutory decision that, along with Goldberg v. Kelly and Shapiro v.
Thompson, seemed to invite the poor under the Constitution’s protective umbrella; Dandridge v. Williams, which just as quickly appeared to
dash those hopes;369 and, just three years later, United States Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno, a puzzling decision in which the Court gave a
less-than-deferential review to an eligibility restriction in the federal
food stamps program (distinguishing between “related” and “non-related” members of a recipient household).370 Moreno, perhaps more
than anything, hints at what constitutional equal protection might
have meant for the poor.371 When examining a welfare program that
did not involve cooperation with the states and was not associated primarily with black, unmarried mothers, the Court brought real “bite”
to its “rational basis” review and indeed struck down the offending
classification.372

369
See 397 U.S. 471, 476–87 (1970); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973) (declaring that it was “not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights”—in this case the right to education—“in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws”); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546–50 (1972)
(applying rational basis review to “the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the
poor”).
370
413 U.S. 528, 529–33 (1973); see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508,
512–14 (1973) (striking down an eligibility provision of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 on the
grounds that it lacked a rational basis).
371
Technically, this case involved the “equal protection component” of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but in keeping with precedent, the Court applied the mode of equal protection analysis developed in Fourteenth Amendment cases. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–34.
372
Id. at 533–38. On the apparent disconnect between Moreno and the Dandridge line
of cases, see, e.g., Mark S. Coven & Robert J. Fersh, Equal Protection, Social Welfare Litigation,
the Burger Court, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 873, 885 (1976) (noting that in Murry and Moreno
“the Court purported to apply the minimum rationality test, yet in result, seemed to apply
a stricter standard”); Margaret Howard, United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno: Reinvigorated Equal Protection for Welfare Recipients, 8 URB. L. ANN. 289, 290–92
(1974) (“There are two possible alternatives that explain [the result in Moreno]: either the
Court is moving toward strict scrutiny in the welfare area or an evolution of equal protection doctrine is in progress.”).
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With the distance of time and the emergence of several other
anomalous equal protection cases,373 scholars have explained Moreno
by reference to “unconstitutional animus”: the Court will take a
harder look at legislation evincing a “bare desire to harm” a politically
unpopular group (in Moreno, “hippies”).374 The decision may also be
understood, however, as part of a long tradition—visible at one time
inside the administrative state but obscured from view by cases like
Dandridge—of a more robust application of the Equal Protection
Clause. As Justice Douglas suggested in his concurrence in Moreno,
and as an administrator like A. D. Smith or Jack Tate would have
agreed, the Constitution ought to protect the poor from being subject
to different standards of behavior just because they are poor.375 This
lost understanding of constitutional equal protection would still have
fallen short, to be sure, of what some poverty lawyers at the time
wanted—namely, a guarantee of a minimally adequate income—but it
would certainly have made a difference to the many Americans who
took their cues from the laws and regulations of the welfare state, and
the many who do so today.

373
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626–35 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amendment dealing with sexual orientation failed rational basis review); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985) (finding that an ordinance
failed rational basis review in a case involving discrimination against the mentally
retarded).
374
See generally Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887
(2013) (using the idea of animus to explain a particular set of Supreme Court equal protection decisions, including Moreno).
375
See 413 U.S. at 544–45 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting how the challenged law
burdens poor people’s right to associate with whom they choose).

